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Introduction
After working for nearly four years on my doctoral thesis, I’m eager to
refrain from just describing what I did in the papers this thesis is based
on and what their relevance for scholars might be. Firstly, because I
hope that my co-author and I manage to explain the importance of our
work already in these chapters. Secondly, it would be too short-sighted
to limit my insights and knowledge gained at the Bonn Graduate School
of Economics to the three chapters collected in this thesis. Therefore,
let me explain, how my research ideas evolved, which deviations I was
obliged to take, and how fully-fledged research papers grew.
The first two chapters of this thesis are in the area of “law and eco-
nomics”. The third chapter has quite a few links to the law and eco-
nomics literature. So what, in a nutshell, is “law and economics”? What
distinguishes this field from others?
Law and economics is sometimes also referred to as “economic analysis
of law”. It started with analyzing antitrust law, regulated industries, tax,
and the determination of monetary damages (Cooter and Ulen (2011),
p.1). Apparently, lawmakers appreciated the insights gained with the
help of economic methods. Therefore, law and economics quickly ex-
tended to nearly all subjects of law, such as criminal law and prop-
erty law. Law and economics has a descriptive and a normative aspect:
The descriptive one evaluates real-world institutions, while the norma-
tive view examines how an ideal law looks like in a given environment
(Shavell (2004), pp. 1-5).
If I was forced to say what was really the core problem of law and
economics, I would certainly point to the incompleteness of contracts.
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But then, what makes law and economics different from contract theory?
Law should constitute a set of rules that rational parties would have
stipulated ex ante if it had been possible to agree on a contract. This
view fits especially for the economic analysis for breach remedies, where
the law constitutes default rules.1 But also other domains re-construct
efficient agreements. For example, tort law can also be seen as a contract
between all possible injurers and all possible victims. The more parties
involved, the more difficult it is to reach ex ante agreements and the
more important the legal rules become. This also explains, why contract
law, which typically deals with relationships between two persons, is
only a set of default rules, while property, tort, or corporate law, which
typically deal with relationships between more parties, are mandatory.
In my view, law and economics is a fascinating topic. One cannot
overestimate the importance of real-world institutions such as contracts
or the right to own property. Failure in such institutions is considered
to be a major obstacle to economic development in poor countries (see,
e.g., Levine (1999)). Being trained both as a lawyer and as an economist,
this was “my field”. I gained my first insight into this field during a
lecture by Professor Winand Emons from Bern University. Therefore, I
wanted to do research in law and economics. I was happy to have the
opportunity to join the Bonn Graduate School of Economics with its
amazing interdisciplinary research environment.
The first chapter is about the economic analysis of bankruptcy law. In
an asymmetric information model, I show that law should give priority
to stakeholders which are uninformed about the firm’s characteristics in
bankruptcy. The second chapter considers a topic in public law: In most
legal systems, the state has the power to unilaterally extract private
persons’ property. It shows how optimal compensation should look like
in order to induce efficient ex ante investments by the landowner and the
government. The third chapter examines a model, where a seller is to
purchase perfect complements from several buyers and shows that there
1Cooter and Ulen (2011), pp. 292-294, Scha¨fer and Ott (2005), pp. 403-419.
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may be a complete breakdown of negotiations.
At this point, the reader may ask: What do these chapters have in
common? Is this thesis a sample of three chapters that don’t have any-
thing to do with each other? My answer to this is: No, they do have a
lot in common and this despite the fact that they belong to other strands
of literature.
The world in each of the chapters is a world of incomplete contracts,
which shows the connection to the core problem of law and economics.
In chapter I, by assumption, the parties cannot agree on the bankruptcy
rule which maximizes their joint surplus. This seems realistic in this
framework, because there are three players and in reality, typically even
more parties are involved in the bankruptcy procedure. Chapter II only
considers two parties. But in principle, every citizen may be victim of a
taking. This makes it too costly or even impossible for the government
to contract with every possible victim of a taking. Chapter I and II have
in common that they re-construct the optimal contract.
The third chapter also considers a setting with at least three involved
parties. It adopts the assumption of Cai (2000) and assumes that the
parties can only make binding cash-offer contracts. While the impact
of more complex contracts is not clear at first glance, the social opti-
mum would certainly be attainable if all involved parties could write a
complete contract. Concerning the eminent domain literature, we can
deduce from this chapter is that the government should be entitled to
take the private property without the owner’s consent. But also in cor-
porate law, this effect can be relevant: An (efficient) takeover of a firm
or an (efficient) restructuring of a firm’s debt may fail due to the large
number of involved parties. Hence, we also provide an argument for
mandatory squeeze-out and bankruptcy rules.
Therefore, in all three chapters, the problem studied arises because
the parties cannot reach the first best with the help of contracts. Hence,
there is a need for mandatory rules in order to reach the social optimum.
This seems especially plausible for settings with many (potentially) in-
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volved parties.
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Information and Priority Rules
The research idea behind chapter I can be traced back to the beginning
of my doctoral studies in Bonn. In my law studies at the University of
Freiburg I had heard about the equitable subordination doctrine. Under
German law, shareholder loans are subordinated in bankruptcy. I knew
that there was a legal debate about this rule because its consequences
were unknown. In other legal systems, any kind of insiders may suffer
from the rule. I thought that the impact of the equitable subordination
doctrine was far from obvious.
I was looking for papers in this area. One of the few papers in this
area was Gelter (2006), which examines a moral hazard-related approach.
This approach, however, yields ambiguous results:
“Even though subordination has some beneficial effects, it deters some desirable rescue attempts and
is an insufficient deterrent for some undesirable ones. Legal reform should thus focus on narrowing
down the scope of application to undesirable shareholder loans, where more severe penalties than sub-
ordination should apply.”
— Martin Gelter
For example, consider a firm with some external creditor and an in-
vestment opportunity. This investment may be efficient or inefficient.
Without the subordination doctrine, the investment would be financed
with a credit because this dilutes the other creditor’s claim in the event
of bankruptcy. Hence, even if the investment is inefficient, the coalition
of the owner and a new creditor may gain in expectation. A subordina-
tion rule can solve this incentive problem by giving priority to the first
creditor’s claim.
But this argument has two major problems: Firstly, as noted by Gelter
(2006), the subordination rule can also deter efficient investments. This
is the case if the value of the first creditor’s claim is increased to the
investment and the increase is larger than the overall net surplus of the
investment. Hence, at first glance, it is not clear whether this rule has
desirable or undesirable consequences.
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Secondly, one cannot explain why this rule should only be applied to
those who are somehow defined insiders of the firm. The described prob-
lem is a general one in corporate finance. Given a relationship between
a debtor and an (old) creditor, the debtor always has an incentive to
issue more debt instead of equity because the old creditor’s claims in
bankruptcy are diluted to some extent. The solution to this problem is
certainly an interesting topic in contract theory and corporate finance,
but it is not specific to the equitable subordination doctrine. Any rule
that stipulates a priority ordering according to the point in time when
the credit was issued would probably be impractical and could deter so-
cially desirable investment as the value of the old creditor’s claims could
be increased.
The scarcity of economic analyses is quite surprising, given that the
equitable subordinations doctrine is prevalent in the real world and be-
cause the number of cases is increasing (Claussen (1996)). Because the
effects of the equitable subordination doctrine was still not very well
understood, I decided to examine another justification for the equitable
subordination doctrine: In contrast to Gelter (2006), my study focuses on
an asymmetric information model. I want to investigate which priority
regime was best in a world where the creditors had different informa-
tion about the firm. The German law allows only the subordination of
owner loans. Nevertheless, to accurately disentangle the role of superior
information from the role of control of the firm, I model two creditors.
Furthermore, under U.S. law, the subordination of credits issued by third
parties is possible, too.
I was looking for a model that considered the interplay of several cred-
itors in such a situation. The literature so far focuses on the importance
of collaterals in credit markets with imperfect information. Prominent
examples are Bester (1985) and Bester (1987). Other papers show how
a right to liquidate the firm’s assets to the creditor can avoid ex post
opportunistic behavior by the entrepreneur (Berglo¨f and von Thadden
(1994)), Bebchuk and Fried (1996)). However, those papers are not
Essays in the Economic Analysis of Corporate and Public Law 7
about ex ante asymmetric information and hence, the effect I wanted to
show could not be deduced.
I set up a model that is similar in vain to Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990). In the model, there is an entrepreneur who wants to conduct
a one-period project, which can either yield a high or a low cash flow.
The low cash flow is less than the initially invested financial means,
i.e., bankruptcy occurs. The entrepreneurs differ with respect to their
individual success probability. In the social optimum, all projects with
positive expected net cash flow are carried out.
The entrepreneur needs financing from two creditors in order to start
the project. One of the creditors is uninformed about the entrepreneur’s
characteristics. In the chapter, welfare is only a function of the set of
realized projects. The chapter compares different priority rules with
respect to their welfare implications.
The chapter’s finding is that too many projects are financed. However,
the overinvestment is less severe if the uninformed creditor enjoys priority
in bankruptcy. The second-best regime from a welfare perspective is a
rule in which the bankruptcy payoff of each creditor is proportional to
size of the credit of this creditor. As a benchmark, equity financing is
considered. With equity financing, welfare is between the pro-rata rule
and informed creditor’s priority.
The intuition for the results is: The uninformed creditor must partly
bear the costs for financing inefficient projects. The more the unin-
formed creditor gets in bankruptcy, the less is the extent to which she
must fund inefficient projects.2 At the one extreme, if the informed cred-
itor receives her full loan back even in bankruptcy, all projects may be
carried out. At the other extreme, consider a situation in which the
uninformed creditor is perfectly insured against bankruptcy. Then the
coalition of the entrepreneur and the informed creditor is in the position
of a residual claimant and has therefore efficient financing incentives,
which means that the first best is achieved. Under equity financing,
2Throughout the chapter, the entrepreneur is referred to as “he” and the creditors as “she”.
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the informed creditor’s share in the low state of the world is between
informed creditor’s priority and the pro-rata rule, from which the afore-
mentioned welfare ranking follows.
As mentioned, if the parties could agree to the efficient priority regime,
a coercive legal rule would be unnecessary. However, ex post opportunis-
tic behavior by the entrepreneur may render such agreements impossible
and such agreements between two different creditors may also be impos-
sible.
Economic Analysis of Taking Rules: the
Bilateral Case
The nucleus of the second chapter of this thesis is based on one of the
many fruitful discussions that I had with my colleague Daniel Go¨ller.
At the time, a large public debate surrounded the necessity of the new
runway that was being constructed at Frankfurt Airport. One day, we
stumbled on the case of Ticona, a German-American plastic manufac-
turer. Ticona had a factory very close to the new runway. There were
worries that the proximity could lead to disasters in the event of a plane
crash. The state government of Hesse threatened Ticona with expropri-
ation. In the end, the airport paid for Ticona to be relocated to another
industrial area.3
We were interested in the legal background of this story. From my
law studies, I knew that the law makes it possible to unilaterally take
private persons’ property. However, in such cases the state has to pay a
compensation that was to be determined by just consideration of inter-
ests. We looked into commentaries and found that this compensation is
usually equivalent to the fair market value.
3To review the Ticona case, see “Fraport einigt sich mit Ticona” and “Kein Pappenstiel fu¨r Fraport”,
both Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 11/26/2006; “Punktlandung in Ho¨chst”, Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung of 09/23/2011; “Ticona feiert neues Werk und lobt Standort”, Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung of 09/26/2011; “Chemiewerk ra¨umt das Feld fu¨r die neue Landebahn”, Welt of
06/15/2011; “Fu¨r Fraport ist eigentlich Ticona schuld”, Frankfurter Rundschau of 12/09/2005.
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We agreed that this could be a problem. Landowners may overinvest in
their property because they know that they are fully insured against the
risk of a taking. Concerning the Ticona case, there has been an ongoing
debate whether this factory could stay there since the ’60s. Nevertheless,
Ticona seemed not to incorporate the risk of a taking, which underpinned
the relevance of the overinvestment. We agreed that this was a valid and
economically interesting point.
We had found an interesting topic with a great relationship to a cur-
rent debate. We built a model where a private person that has to fear
an expropriation can make some ex ante specific investment. We did in-
deed find that full compensation leads to overinvestment incentives. By
contrast, a regime that awarded the full social surplus to the landowner
leads to efficient investment incentives.
But very soon, we discovered an article published 27 years ago in the
Quarterly Journal of Economics: Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984).
This article had virtually the same topic, used a very similar model and,
consequently, had very similar results. Their article is intended to be
provocative because they claim that no compensation leads to efficient
investment incentives. We had slightly different results, which, however,
would not have been sufficient to warrant another article. Despite the
fact that the problem we were thinking about seemed to be interesting
for other scholars as well, we were rather disappointed. Time to start
from scratch.
The Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984) article is not the only paper
in this area. Many of them challenge an assumption Blume, Rubinfeld,
and Shapiro (1984) use: The government always maximizes welfare. This
phenomenon is referred to as “fiscal illusion”. One notably example is
Hermalin (1995). He states:
“In legal writing one motive for compensating a citizen for taken property is to restrain the state from
the tyrannical use of its rights of regulation or eminent domain. That is, the state is assumed not
to act benevolently but to act on behalf of the interest of the majority (i.e., the rest of society) while
essentially ignoring the interest of the individual property owner.”
— Benjamin E. Hermalin
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We agreed that, in such situations, it made sense to consider not only
investments by the landowner, but also by the government. Also in the
airport-Ticona example, this is very natural: Not only Ticona had made
investments prior to a possible taking. Also the airport had to invest
resources for geological exploration. It had to find out how this new
runway could be realized and what the approach paths had to look like.
But also in other real-world examples this may well be the case: The
government may have to explore how to use a certain area as a disposal
site for nuclear waste. Essentially, we had to analyze a setting of bilateral
investment.
Throughout the chapter, we assume that the landowner has no possi-
bility to challenge the taking itself, but can only request due compensa-
tion from a court. In the main part of our work, we consider a situation in
which the government suffers from fiscal illusion or is “non-benevolent”.
Naturally, any assumption about the government’s behavior is arbitrary
to some extent. But, in this framework, we reason that a non-benevolent
government would maximize the difference between the project’s value
and due compensation. Firstly, such a government may pursue the inter-
ests of the voters’ majority, hence ignore the interests of the landowner.
Secondly, as it was the case in the Ticona-airport example, the govern-
ment could act on behalf of a private entity that enjoys the project’s
value, but has also to pay due compensation.
If the government is indeed non-benevolent, all standard compensation
regimes perform poorly. If the full fair market value is compensated, the
taking decision by the government is efficient and it invests efficiently
given the investment by the landowner. However, she is fully insured
against a taking and has therefore an incentive to overinvest. In this
sense, we are able to confirm the results of Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro
(1984).
Under the regime proposed by Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984),
i.e., to pay no compensation to the landowner, a taking will always occur.
This exactly reflects the fear of a “Leviathan” state. In the model, this
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naturally leads to inefficient decisions because the government takes the
property even if the social is less than the private value. Given this, both
the government and the landowner have efficient investment incentives.
This implies that the landowner invests nothing.
Another compensation regime which has been proposed in previous
articles is to grant the landowner the full social value of her property.4
Among others, Hermalin (1995) proposes this compensation regime. In
the setting of chapter II, this makes the government indifferent between
a taking and leaving the property to the landowner. So, the efficient
taking decision can at least be supported as an equilibrium. Moreover, as
the landowner cannot influence the amount of compensation, she invests
efficiently. However, as the government always has to pay the full social
value, her ex post surplus is equal to zero. Therefore, she has no ex ante
incentives to invest. Consequently, the airport would not invest at all in
the exploration of the geological conditions of the area.
Chapter II finds an alternative solution that yields the social optimum:
Due compensation should be equal to the property’s value given that the
landowner had invested efficiently. Then, the government would always
take the property if the actual social value was higher than the property’s
value given that the landowner had invested efficiently. Given this ex
post taking decision, the government invests the same amount as in the
social optimum independent of what the landowner does. The landowner
can neither influence the probability of a taking nor the amount of due
compensation. Therefore, she has efficient investment incentives given
the investment by the government.
The solution is related to the notion of “efficient expectation damages”
in Cooter (1985), but extends this to a bilateral setting. Besides its
elegance, it has its drawbacks. It requires the court to calculate the
optimal investment from an ex ante perspective.
As a benchmark, the case of a benevolent government is considered.
This means that the government takes the land whenever the social ex-
4The government is referred to as “it”, the landowner is a “she”.
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ceeds the private value of the property. In this case, only the landowner’s
decision problem needs to be analyzed. The government plays the so-
cially optimal response to any investment of the landowner. If the
landowner invests the socially optimal amount, we reach the social op-
timum. In order to make the landowner invest efficiently, compensation
must be equal to the social value of the project. Under this compensa-
tion regime, the landowner’s surplus is identical to welfare. Under any
other commonly proposed regime, she overinvests in private property.
She does so for two reasons: Firstly, she may increase her compensation
in case of a taking. Secondly, she can reduce the probability of a taking.
What makes this chapter special, is the comparison of the two regimes:
If the government is budget-constrained, it may be possible that only
under the non-benevolent government the first best is attainable. This
is because the non-benevolent government has to pay less compensation
than the benevolent one. The non-benevolent government’s advantage is
that it can credibly commit to take the property whenever due compen-
sation is lower than project’s value, whereas the benevolent government
takes the property only when it is ex post socially desirable.
Chapter II also uses a machinery which is different from previous ap-
proaches, such as in Che and Chung (1999).5 The mapping from in-
vestments into realized values does not need to be differentiable. Fur-
thermore, in settings of bilateral investment, this technique allows much
more elegant proofs because one does not need to calculate with the help
of integrals.
Breakdown in Multilateral Bargaining
Having completed the paper about the economic analysis of compensa-
tion for takings, we thought that a natural extension was the justification
for eminent domain. The common justification cited by other papers
such as Miceli and Segerson (2007a) and Shavell (2010) is the “hold-out”
5This technique is also used in Schweizer (2006) and Go¨ller (2011).
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problem. According to them, the problem could emerge if public author-
ities had to buy adjacent blocks of land. Landowners would delay their
purchase and wait to be the last one to sell their land to the government
in order to get a large part of the surplus.
However, this argument is still in its infancy. The papers only consider
one specific model with two periods. Although the problem is isomorphic
to any situation in which one central party wants to buy perfect comple-
ments from different sellers, there is only very few connections to such
models, as Cai (2000), Cai (2003), and Menezes and Pitchford (2004).
We thought that these models could show us a model which yielded a
breakdown or at least some delay. But, very soon, we alighted on the
following quote:
“Multiplicity of equilibria unfortunately makes the models lose predictive power. This is especially
problematic for the bargaining literature, because usually there is a continuum of equilibrium outcomes
in bargaining models that do not have a unique equilibrium. [...]However, when a complete information
model has a unique stationary or Markov equilibrium, it must be efficient.“
—Hongbin Cai
At first glance, this is a disappointing finding. In an applied paper, it
is difficult to make the case for a rule if even without the rule the first
best is attainable. Referees and editors in a law and economics journal
would rather not buy a model in which the purpose of an institution is
to destroy inefficient equilibria. Time to start from scratch.
At that point, we decided to forget about things like Markov perfect
equilibria and stationarity for a moment. Besides the obviously correct
strategic delay problem there was still another aspect: If some sellers
refuse to sell their property, the buyer has spent large amounts without
receiving anything. Think of an airport: If it has managed to acquire
only some of the parcels that it needs for a new runway, it won’t certainly
start to feed the pigs. In other words, the airport may have a lower
stand-alone valuation than the sellers.
We considered a simple numerical example and figured out that later
sellers might be able to extract more than the ex ante pie. If this is
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the case, a breakdown in negotiations occurs as the unique equilibrium
outcome. In order to establish this result, we do not need any refinements
such as Markov perfect equilibria or stationarity. Finally, we were able
to show that there are situations in which negotiations would lead to
inefficient outcomes.
This was an important step for our research. So far, not a single
paper examines the impact of a situation in which the buyer had a lower
stand-alone valuation than the seller. Previous papers on multilateral
bargaining make implicitly a simplifying assumption: They assume that
the central party is able to derive the same stand-alone utility as the
sellers. We agreed that this was only an innocent assumption if either
only one farmer was involved or if the airport was able to derive the
same stand-alone utility from the goods as the farmers, which needs not
to be true.
This is what got us really started. Because the driving force behind the
breakdown result does not depend on a specific structure, we decided to
consider a large class of games instead of a specific game. The finding is
that in every game breakdown occurs with certainty for some parameter
constellations. This result holds even without any refinement criteria.
Compared to previous work in bargaining theory, this is a very strong
result. Other papers find that results depend heavily on the assumed
bargaining structure.
If the last farmer to sell his property has a non-negative bargaining
power, his share may be larger than the net social surplus. If this is the
case, the coalition of the first farmer and the airport cannot make positive
profits. Hence, they will never agree on a land purchase. A similar logic
applies if the airport makes simultaneous offers to the farmers. For the
farmers to accept immediately such an offer both need to receive at least
the payoff they would get in bilateral bargaining. The sum of these
payoffs may well be greater than what the airport is willing to pay.
The two-seller case contains most of this chapter’s innovation. Never-
theless, we also study the impact of the number of farmers. So, chapter
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III takes a specific bargaining procedure that was particularly easy to
solve: A fixed ordering of the farmers is taken as given. The airport
plays a standard alternating-offers game with each of the farmers. Only
if it has reached an agreement with one of the farmers, it is allowed to
move to the next one. The big advantage of this bargaining procedure is
that it has only one subgame perfect equilibrium. Cai (2000) assumes a
slightly different procedure. Nevertheless, he is not able to derive all the
equilibria of the game. For any given parameter constellation a break-
down occurs if the number of farmers is sufficiently large. With the
growing number of farmers the project size and the total value of the
land that is necessary are held constant. Again, this is an interesting
result because for any given project size and social surplus breakdown
can occur.
After the literature had been looking for inefficiencies in multilateral
bargaining for years, chapter III is able to make an interesting point. An
interesting extension could be to enlarge the contract space and allow
for contracts that are contingent on later agreements between the airport
and other farmers. But, nevertheless, the model finds a very intuitive
explanation for a frequently observed phenomenon in real life: The fact
that negotiations between several parties often involve inefficiencies.
Of course, this insight is not limited to the justification for eminent
domain. It can also be applied to the economic analysis of bankruptcy
law or takeovers of a corporation. At this point, we can see a connection
to the first chapter.
Chapter III offers an explanation for bargaining inefficiencies. While
the impact of more complex contracts is not clear at first glance, the
bargaining inefficiencies would certainly not exist if all involved parties
could write a complete contract. Hence, also chapter III models a world
of incomplete contracts.
I. Information and Priority
Rules
Bankruptcy and corporate laws in several countries al-
low or require courts to subordinate loans by sharehold-
ers to corporations. Examples include the equitable
subordination and recharacterization doctrines in US
and German law. Scholars have not devoted much at-
tention to these rules so far despite their rather un-
clear economic implications. We propose a model that
focuses on the role of information and ex ante invest-
ment incentives. We found that informational asym-
metries can justify the requalification: The more pri-
ority is given to the uninformed creditor, the better are
the results from a welfare perspective.
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1. Introduction
In many legal systems, credits given by an owner of a significant amount
of shares are fulfilled after the other creditors’ claims in bankruptcy.
In U.S. law, §510 bankruptcy code lays down that a claim can be sub-
ordinated by the court. This is the case when the creditor has acted
inequitably1 and harmed the debtor or the debtor’s other creditors. The
consequence is that the claim’s priority is reduced, so that the other cred-
itors’ claims are fulfilled before. According to these rules, bankruptcy
courts have the power to subordinate claims on any grounds recognized
in equity (Feibelman (2007), pp. 172-173). The scope of the provisions is
very broad. For instance, all kinds of insiders may have to suffer from the
rule, i.e., “any person in control of the debtor”.2 However, superior infor-
mation alone is not sufficient for the court to subordinate a loan. Other
legal systems have similar rules.3 Under German law, credits issued by
large stockholders are automatically subordinated.4 A subordination of
claims by close persons is not possible.
Despite the high practical relevance of these provisions5 and their
rather unclear implications, economic analyses are surprisingly rare. The
economic analysis of bankruptcy law mostly considers a firm that is al-
ready in financial distress and does not consider ex ante investment in-
1which refers to equity not as a term in finance, but rather to justice.
2cf. the definition in Bankruptcy Code §101 (31).
3For an overview, see Gelter (2006). In German law the credit given by an owner of at least one
tenth of the shares is served after all other claims raised in the bankruptcy procedure (cf. §39
of the German bankruptcy code). The argument made by legal scholars is that the owner of a
corporation should bear the consequences of the firm’s financing and should not transfer the firm’s
risk to the creditors (Kirchhof, Lwowski, and Stu¨rner (2008), §135, No. 1-4.). Until recently the
requalification required that the loan was given in a crisis of the firm, i.e., in a situation where
no third party would have given a credit to it. Under German law, only the claims of the owner
of the firm can be subordinated. Claims of insiders or close persons cannot be subordinated, not
even at the discretion of the court.
4Cf. §39 InsO (German Bankruptcy Code).
5Gelter (2006), Claussen (1996), p. 317, describes a massive increase in the number of cases since
1985.
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centives.6
Gelter (2006) examines a moral-hazard related justification for the eq-
uitable subordination doctrine: After a creditor has issued a credit, the
owner or a close person grants another credit, which decreases the first
creditor’s claims in bankruptcy. Obviously, one of the legislator’s mo-
tives in such a situation would be to react to this externality and to deter
socially undesirable credits by the owner or close person. However, Gel-
ter shows that if the liquidation value before the second credit is lower
than the first creditor’s claim, the rule may also deter socially desirable
investments. Furthermore, the equitable subordination doctrine would
not solve these problems: As long as there are no informational asym-
metries, the creditor could also demand a loan from an outside creditor
to which the doctrine cannot be applied.
Therefore, we focus on the role of informational asymmetries. We
analyze how this can lead to inefficient outcomes and how these outcomes
are influenced by bankruptcy rules. We consider a model related to
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), where an entrepreneur wants to conduct
a project that randomly yields either a low or a high cash flow. The
probability of success denotes the entrepreneur’s type. The project is
only started if it is financed by two creditors. Only one of the creditors
is able to observe the entrepreneur’s type. As an example, consider a
relationship bank with limited lending capacity which can observe the
true success probability of the project. We compare different priority
rules with respect to their welfare implications.
We find that, generally, too many projects are realized. The main
result is that the more priority is given to the uninformed creditor, the
less are the overinvestment incentives and the better are the results from
a welfare perspective. Let us consider two extreme cases: If the un-
6Commonly studied topics include under which conditions a firm should be reorganized or liquidated
and how managers’ incentives are (Posner (1977), pp. 544-511), whether contracts can substitute
the mandatory bankruptcy procedure (White (2007), pp. 1038-1040), whether the current state
of law promotes efficient incentives (White (1989)) or how the pie should be distributed in case of
bankruptcy in order to reach fairness and efficiency (Bebchuk (1988)).
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informed creditor’s claim has priority and if even the low cash flow is
sufficient to repay it, she bears no default risk. Then, the informed cred-
itor bears the whole loss risk and therefore grants a loan if and only if
it is socially profitable. At the other extreme, under informed creditor’s
priority, if even the low cash flow is sufficient to repay the claim, she
accepts the offer by the entrepreneur independent of his type. Then,
either all or none of the projects will be financed, depending on whether
all projects on average are socially profitable. This would also be the
case if both creditors were uninformed. Consequently, from a social view-
point, the creditor’s information is lost. Equity financing performs rather
poorly in our setting because the informed party receives relatively much
in the bad state of the world. Accordingly, informational asymmetries
can provide an additional justification for the equitable subordination
doctrine. Hence, claims of parties with superior information about the
entrepreneur’s characteristics should be subordinated in bankruptcy.
Our result is related to the pecking-order hypothesis7, according to
which firms prefer to issue secure claims in an asymmetric information
framework. Moreover, the results are related to papers that emphasize
the value of collaterals in credit markets with imperfect information.8
However, none of these models considers the interplay between an en-
trepreneur and two types of creditors. Also related are papers in which
there is no ex ante type uncertainty, but creditors try to avoid ex post op-
portunistic behavior by the entrepreneur, e.g., with the help of a threat
to liquidate the entrepreneur’s assets. Bebchuk and Fried (1996) and
Berglo¨f and von Thadden (1994) consider the interplay of several credi-
tors. Other papers include Bizer and DeMarzo (1992), Bester (1994) and
Hart and Moore (1998). Bebchuk (2002) examines a trade-off between
incentives to efficient project choice and ex post efficient continuation.
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) endogenize the number of creditors in such
a setting.
7Tirole (2006), pp. 246-249 and Myers (1984).
8Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Bester (1985) and Bester (1987).
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Concluding that subordination is beneficial, one could make a case for
why it should be mandatory law. Gelter (2006) addresses these concerns,
but does not find a solution to this.
In the relationship between several creditors such an ordering will
usually be difficult in the absence of collaterals.9 Credit safeguarding
may not always be possible.10 Debt contracts are only valid between the
parties and other stakeholders have no possibility to observe whether
a certain agreement has been made. Furthermore, agreements between
the owner and one of the creditors about the priority of third-party
claims are void. Scholars see the large amount of creditors and different
preferences about the bankruptcy procedure as an obstacle to contract
about the procedure.11 For instance, the content of future contracts is
difficult to oversee.12 These arguments often refer to the choice of the
bankruptcy procedure13, but can also explain why priority agreements
between different creditors may not be possible.
By contrast, priority agreements between the owner and a creditor are
binding. However,the entrepreneur may ex post be able to convert his
contribution to debt (hidden action). In most legal systems, the amount
of equity is observable in the commercial register and if equity is lowered,
the creditor can request back his loan.14 However, monitoring the en-
trepreneur’s behavior or changes of the commercial register may be too
costly. This is especially plausible when there is a large number of credi-
tors with little stakes. Bebchuk and Fried (1996) call those“nonadjusting
9Collaterals are commonly used in order to reach priority agreements. As many forms of collaterals
must be registered in a publicly observable register, they are also valid in the relationship between
several creditors.
10Either we may have assets with high sunk costs, where the value for potential buyers is close to
zero. Then the enforcement of these collaterals will not be worthwhile for the creditor. Or we have
assets that cannot serve as a security at all, because of legal (e.g., the entrepreneur’s idea is not
protected as a patent) or economic reasons (if the value of the idea or the patent is stochastic and
its value is highly positively correlated with the entrepreneur’s success).
11Schwartz (1997), p. 128.
12Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992), pp. 6-7.
13White (2007), p. 1040.
14For German law, cf. §§58 GmbHG(Limited Act), 225 AktG (Stock Company Act).
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creditors”. Furthermore, the owners could secretly lower their equity by
buying assets from themselves at unreasonably high prices. Hence, there
may be moral-hazard behavior by the entrepreneur that might prevent
the parties from reaching the desired outcome by contract.
The chapter is organized as follows: In section 2, we present the model
without describing the informational structure. In section 3, we con-
sider the full information case as a benchmark. Section 4 investigates
the asymmetric information case and compares the different bankruptcy
rules and equity financing with respect to their welfare implications.
Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
We consider a model with three risk-neutral parties, an entrepreneur
E, also referred to as “he”, and two creditors U, I, both referred to as
“she”.15 The entrepreneur has no financial means himself and needs
financing from both creditors to start a project which may be efficient or
inefficient. The creditors’ contributions are fixed and amount to dU and
dI , respectively. We denote the sum of the contributions as D := dU+dI .
W.l.o.g. we normalize D = 1. Once the project is started, it can either
generate a low cash flow YL < D or a high cash flow YH > D. The
probability of the high cash flow is given by q ∈ [0, 1] and is different
between the entrepreneurs. Hence, q denotes the entrepreneur’s type.
For simplicity, let us assume that the parties do not discount between
financing and the realization of the cash flows, or, in other words, that
the riskless interest rate is equal to zero.
In the social optimum, all projects with positive expected net cash
flow are realized. This is the case if and only if:
qYH + (1− q)YL ≥ D ⇔ q ≥ D − YL
YH − YL =: q
SO,
where qSO denotes the socially optimal threshold.
15In the asymmetric information case U means “uninformed” and I “informed”.
Essays in the Economic Analysis of Corporate and Public Law 22
After q is chosen by nature according to a uniform distribution on [0, 1],
the entrepreneur offers a credit contract rU to creditor U in a take-it-or-
leave-it fashion, where rU is E ￿s repayment obligation. The repayment
obligation is non-contingent in the sense that it cannot condition on the
ex post realized state of the world, which may either be YH or YL. The
U−creditor’s decision is denoted zU ∈ {0, 1}, where zU = 1 means that
she accepts the offer. After U ￿s decision, the entrepreneur moves to the
next creditor I. E proposes her a non-contingent repayment obligation
in a take-it-or-leave-it fashion, too, which is denoted rI . I ￿s decision is
denoted zI ∈ {0, 1}. At this point, we do not yet say anything about the
informational structure.
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Figure I.1.: Timeline of the model
If at least one of the creditors refuses the entrepreneur’s offer, the
payoffs are zero for all parties. Hence, the payoffs for three parties E,U, I
are given by zU ·zI ·(φE,φU−dU ,φI−dI), where φ := (φE,φU ,φI) denotes
the payments the three parties receive if the project is carried out. For
convenience, let us assume that even if at least one of the creditors rejects
the offer, nature determines the state of the world and that φ takes the
values as defined in the next paragraph.
If both creditors accept the offer, the project is started and nature de-
termines whether the high cash flow YH or the low cash flow YL occurs,
where the high cash flow is realized with probability q. If the project
is carried out and if the cash flow Y is sufficient to serve the creditors’
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claims (rU + rI ≤ Y ), the payments are determined by the contractual
agreements, which implies φ = (Y − rU − rI , rU , rI). If the claims exceed
the cash flow (rU + rI > Y ), the bankruptcy rule determines the pay-
ments. Note that this is always the case when YL is realized, but may also
occur in the good state of the world. In bankruptcy, the entrepreneur
receives nothing (φE = 0). We assume that the bankruptcy procedure is
free of costs, φU +φI = Y . We consider three different bankruptcy rules:
Under (i) U ￿s and (ii) I ￿s priority U ￿s and I ￿s claims are fulfilled first,
respectively. Under (iii) the pro-rata rule, the bankruptcy payment is
proportional to the credit initially invested. Formally, the rule in place
α is defined as:
Priority of U (αU): φU = min[Y, rU ], and φI = Y − φU
Priority of I (αI): φU = Y − φI , and φI = min[Y, rI ]
Pro-Rata Rule (αP ):
(φU ,φI) =

(dUY, dIY ) if rU ≥ dUY and rI ≥ dIY
(Y − rI , rI) if rU ≥ dUY and rI < dIY
(rU , Y − rU) if rU < dUY and rI ≥ dIY.
Under the pro-rata rule, if both claims are sufficiently high, each of the
creditors receives the share of the cash flow proportional to her credit
(see the first line). If the repayment claim of one creditor falls short of
this share, this creditor gets her repayment claim and the other party
the remainder. This essentially excludes that one party may profit from
bankruptcy. Note that if both repayment claims fall short of the share
proportional to the credit, we have rI + rU < Y and, consequently, there
is no bankruptcy. In the following, we compare the bankruptcy rules
with respect to their welfare implications.
3. The Full Information Case
As a benchmark, let us consider the full information case, in which both
creditors can observe the true value of q and the full history of the
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game. As we have proper subgames, we use the concept of the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). We can solve this game by backwards
induction. Let us fix any rU , rI and any zU and observe which is the
equilibrium value of I ￿s decision z∗I (α, q, rU , zU).
If U has accepted the entrepreneur’s offer (zU = 1), the I-creditor
accepts if she expects a (weakly) positive payoff:
z∗I (α, q, rU , rI , zU = 1) =
￿
1 if E[φI(α, rU , rI , Y )|q] ≥ dI
0 else,
(I.1)
where E[φI(α, rU , rI , Y )|q] = qφI(α, rU , rI , YH) + (1− q)φI(α, rU , rI , YL)
is the expectation value of the payment to I given a (known) value of q.
If zU = 0, hence if the U -creditor has refused the entrepreneur’s offer, I ￿s
decision is arbitrary because the payoffs are 0 for all parties independent
of her action. Let us assume that then she employs action (I.1), too.
Anticipating this, the entrepreneur makes I an offer such that she
exactly breaks even. Observe that under any rule, if bankruptcy occurs
and if the payment to I in bankruptcy falls short of her repayment claim
rI , a further increase in rI does not increase the payment she receives.
Hence, r∗I = r
∗
I(α, q, rU , zU = 1) is implicitly given by
qr∗I + (1− q)φI(α, rU , r∗I , YL) = dI . (I.2)
Note that this equation has a unique solution because φI is continuous
and increasing in r∗I and hence, the left-hand side is continuous and
strictly increasing in r∗I . The actions according to (I.1) and (I.2) are
unique if U has accepted E ￿s offer (zU = 1) and YH − rU − r∗I > 0
holds because the entrepreneur could offer the I−creditor a tiny amount
more and ensure himself and the I−creditor a strictly positive payoff.
Of course the entrepreneur may offer anything if he anticipates that the
offer is rejected anyway, if U has rejected the offer, or if YH−rU −r∗I ≤ 0
holds. Then, his payoff is zero anyway. For the moment, let us assume
that then I and E play the actions (I.1) and (I.2), too.
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Ex ante, E and U anticipate r∗I(α, q, rU , zU) and z
∗
I (α, q, rU , r
∗
I , zU). U
accepts if and only if she expects to break even:
z∗U(α, q, rU) =
￿
1 if z∗I · E[φU(α, rU , r∗I , Y )− dU |q] ≥ 0
0 else.
(I.3)
Note that this expression is well-defined as neither r∗I nor z
∗
I are functions
of zU . Similar to rI , r∗U(α, q) is implicitly given by
qr∗U + (1− q)φU(r∗U , r∗I , YL) = dU . (I.4)
Note that (I.4) has a unique solution as φU is continuous and increasing
in r∗U .
16 Observe that whenever r∗I , z
∗
I are not unique in equilibrium, the
entrepreneur’s payoff is zero. Hence, if r∗U + r
∗
I according to (I.2) and
(I.4) is less than YH , the above actions are unique. Reorganizing yields:
r∗U + r
∗
I < YH
⇔q(r∗U + r∗I) + (1− q)YL < qYH + (1− q)YL
⇔
=dU￿ ￿￿ ￿
qr∗U + (1− q)φU(r∗U , r∗I , YL)+
=dI￿ ￿￿ ￿
qr∗I + (1− q)φI(α, rU , r∗I , YL)
< qYH + (1− q)YL
⇔D < qYH + (1− q)YL
⇔qSO < q.
Hence, all socially efficient projects are carried out in any equilibrium.
For q < qSO, r∗U + r
∗
I < YH holds and, consequently, at least one of the
creditors cannot break even. Only for qSO the outcome is indeterminate.
We can conclude that
Proposition I.1: Under full information, independent of the bankruptcy
rule, first best is the unique equilibrium outcome. In this sense, no rank-
ing of the bankruptcy rules is possible.
16Although r∗I (rU ) is weakly increasing in rU , φI(α, rU , r
∗
I (rU ), YL) cannot be increasing in rU be-
cause then I ￿s zero profit-condition (I.2) would be violated. Hence, φU (α, rU , r∗I (rU ), YL) =
YL − φI(α, rU , r∗I (rU ), YL) is increasing in rU .
Essays in the Economic Analysis of Corporate and Public Law 26
The intuition for this result is that if a project is efficient from a social
perspective, the entrepreneur is able to make offers to both creditors
such that they break even. This result is related to Buckley (1986), who
shows that under perfect information the existence of collaterals does not
have an impact on the firm’s value - a result in the spirit of the theory of
Modigliani and Miller (1958). The result is also quite intuitive as, under
symmetric information, at least one of the creditors cannot break even
when the project is socially not profitable, whereas both creditors can
break even when this is the case.
4. The Asymmetric Information Case
In the last section, we found that no ranking between the bankruptcy
rules is possible under full information. Now, we turn to the asymmetric
information case, in which the U− or uninformed creditor is not able
to observe the true value of q. She only knows that q is uniformly dis-
tributed between 0 and 1. Because we consider a game with asymmetric
information, we need to define U ￿s beliefs: µ : rU → µ(q, rU) assigns
densities to all possible values of q for a given information set rU . We
use the sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson (1982)) as solution
concept.
4.1. The One-Creditor Case
Before turning attention to the different rules, let us consider as an-
other benchmark case dU = D, dI = 0, i.e., the case in which there is
only the uninformed creditor. Then, there is no difference between the
bankruptcy rules.
Given any offer rU by the entrepreneur, the uninformed creditor has
some belief about the entrepreneur’s type. The creditor is able to calcu-
late her expected payoff for any given entrepreneur type. Hence, for a
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Figure I.2.: Timeline: One creditor with asymmetric information
given rU , her expected payoff is given by￿ 1
0
µ(q, rU)E[φU(rU , Y )−D|q] d q.
She has a strict incentive to accept any offer that gives her a positive
payoff in expectation and to reject any offer that yields her a strictly
negative payoff. For convenience, let us assume that she accepts also
any offer that yields her zero payoff:
z∗U(rU) =
￿
1 if
￿ 1
0 µ(q, rU)E[φU(rU , Y )−D|q] d q ≥ 0
0 else.
Note that this holds both for values on and off the equilibrium path,
where the expectation on the equilibrium path is derived with the help
of Bayes’ rule. The entrepreneur wants to minimize the creditor’s repay-
ment claim under the condition that she accepts the offer.17 Formally,
this can be written as:
r∗U(q) ∈ argmax
z∗U(rU)
rU
. (I.5)
Note that if there is no value of rU such that U breaks even, she rejects
any offer, and, consequently, the entrepreneur’s payoff is zero indepen-
dent of his offer. As a direct corollary from (I.5), we can focus on equi-
libria in which all entrepreneur types offer the same rU , which is different
17Note that this action is not unique if all offers rU that are accepted by the uninformed creditor
exceed YH . But still, this value is part of a reasonable equilibrium.
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to the well-known signaling framework in Cho and Kreps (1987). This
is because there is no signal but the offer to the uninformed creditor. As
all entrepreneurs want to minimize their payment to the creditor, they
all choose the same rU .
Now, we know what happens in the game for a given belief system
µ(q, rU). Furthermore, we know that on the equilibrium path, the belief
system is determined with the help of Bayes’ rule. However, for any offer
rU ￿= r∗U off the equilibrium path, the creditor may assign arbitrarily low
values of q and consequently, think that she does not break even. Hence,
any level of rU can be an equilibrium offer by the entrepreneur. How-
ever, taking into account that the entrepreneur makes the uninformed
creditor a take-it-or-leave-it offer, it is safe to consider those equilibria
in which the creditor makes exactly zero profit.18 Therefore, let us as-
sume that, in any equilibrium, the uninformed creditor assigns the same
probability to all types given that a deviation has been observed. This
assumption can be justified with the fact that all entrepreneur types
offer the same rU in equilibrium. With this refinement criterion, U ￿s
believed payoff for any offer off the equilibrium path rU ￿= r∗U is given by￿ 1
0 µ(q, rU)E[φU(rU , Y )−D|q] d q, which is equal to her payoff if this rU
was offered by all types. Hence, the entrepreneur sets rU such that she
makes exactly zero profits. We establish
Proposition I.2: In the one-creditor asymmetric information case, the
following sequential equilibrium exists:
E: r∗U = 2D − YL
U: z∗U =
￿
1 if
￿ 1
0 µ(q, rU)E[φU(rU , Y )−D|q] d q
0 else.
The creditor’s beliefs are µ(q, rU) = 1, ∀q ∈ [0, 1], ∀rU ≥ dU .
In this equilibrium, either all or none of the projects get started.
18E.g. Tirole (2006), p. 242-244 implicitly assumes the same.
Essays in the Economic Analysis of Corporate and Public Law 29
Proof. U ￿s zero profit condition yields
￿ 1
0 qr
∗
U + (1 − q)YL d q = D and
is solved by r∗U = 2D − YL.
The beliefs are consistent: On the equilibrium path, all types offer
r∗U , from which the above distribution follows. For off-equilibrium path
beliefs, consider the following trembling function that assigns probabili-
ties to any rU off the equilibrium path: rU → ￿f(rU), where f(rU) is a
density function with f(rU) > 0, ∀rU and
￿∞
dU
f(rU)drU = 1, and ￿ < 1
is a number that converges to zero. The density value for any q given a
deviation rU ￿= r∗U has been observed is: ￿f(rU )￿f(rU ) ￿ 10 1dq = 1, where
￿ 1
0 1dq is
the (uniform) distribution of q on [0, 1].
Note that if the projects are not profitable on average (
￿ 1
0 qYH + (1−
q)YL d q < D), the entrepreneur cannot make an offer such that U breaks
even. If they are profitable (
￿ 1
0 qYH +(1− q)YL d q ≥ D), all projects are
realized.
The result in proposition (I.2) is of course inefficient. In the next
sections, we will examine how the share dI of the informed creditor can
be used in order to achieve a better result from a welfare perspective.
4.2. The Two-Creditors Case
Now, we come to the main and most interesting part of the chapter.
Here, we again consider a situation with two creditors, U and I. Here,
U is the uninformed and I the informed creditor. U is not able to observe
the true entrepreneur’s type q. By contrast, I observes the true value of
q and the full history of the game.
Let us proceed as follows: We analyze each of the cases separately
and compare the welfare implications afterwards. As the equilibrium
outcomes are not unique for most of the cases, we select for each case a
reasonable equilibrium that fulfills some properties such as the restriction
on off-equilibrium path beliefs already employed in the one-creditor case.
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Figure I.3.: Timeline: Two creditors with asymmetric information
4.3. Uninformed Creditor’s Priority
To begin with, consider uninformed creditor’s priority. As the informed
creditor is the residual claimant of the firm’s cash flow, this case resem-
bles to her holding equity. For purposes of the analysis, let us distinguish
between two cases: In the first one, dU ≤ YL holds, i.e., even the low
cash flow is sufficient to pay back U ￿s loan. In the second one (dU > YL),
U ￿s repayment claim exceeds her credit dU .
Uninformed Creditor’s Priority with dU ≤ YL
As any sequential equilibrium is subgame perfect, the informed creditor
accepts any offer that makes her break even, and, anticipating this, the
entrepreneur sets r∗I = r
∗
I(αU , q, rU , zU) such that she exactly breaks even
z∗I (αU , q, rU , rI , zU) =
￿
1 if E[φI(αU , rU , rI , Y )|q] ≥ dI
0 else
(I.1)
qr∗I + (1− q)φI(rU , r∗I , YL) = dI , (I.2)
like in the full information case. Again, the actions (I.1) and (I.2) are
unique if U has accepted E ￿s offer (zU = 1) and if YH−rU −r∗I > 0 holds
because then the entrepreneur could offer the I−creditor a tiny amount
more and ensure himself and the I−creditor a strictly positive payoff. Of
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course the entrepreneur may offer any amount if he anticipates that his
offer is rejected anyway, if U has rejected the offer, or if YH−rU −r∗I ≤ 0
holds. In this case his payoff is zero anyway.
Because of dU ≤ YL, the uninformed creditor gets at least her credit
back independent of which state of the world occurs. Hence, in equilib-
rium, the entrepreneur offers the least value of rU such that the unin-
formed creditor breaks even, which she accepts:
z∗U(αU , rU) =
￿
1 if rU ≥ dU
0 else
r∗U(αU , q) = dU .
Note that the above actions are even unique if YH−r∗U−r∗I(αU , q, rU , zU) >
0 holds. Observing that φI(αU , r∗U , r
∗
I , YL) = YL− dU , we can reorganize:
YH − r∗U − r∗I > 0⇔ YH > dU +
dI − (1− q)(YL − dU)
q
qYH + (1− q)YL > D ⇔ q > qSO.
Hence, in any equilibrium, all strictly efficient projects are realized. For
strictly inefficient projects, the informed creditor cannot break even,
which means that these projects are not carried out. Only for q = qSO
the outcome is indeterminate. We can conclude that
Proposition I.3: Under uninformed creditor’s priority and when even
the low cash flow is sufficient to pay back U ￿s loan (dU ≤ YL), first best
is the unique equilibrium outcome.
Intuitively, the uninformed creditor’s claim is fulfilled in any state of
the world, which means that she does not suffer from the financing of
inefficient projects.
Uninformed Creditor’s Priority with dU > YL
Now, let us consider the case, in which the low cash flow is not suffi-
cient to repay U ￿s claim. Here we are no longer able to derive a unique
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equilibrium outcome. Note that the informed creditor receives nothing
in bankruptcy as rU ≥ dU > YL holds. Given any rU , zU , E and I play
the following actions:
z∗I (αU , q, rU , rI , zU) =
￿
1 if E[φI(αU , rU , rI , Y )|q] ≥ dI
0 else
(I.6)
qr∗I + (1− q)φI(αU , rU , r∗I , YL)￿ ￿￿ ￿
=0
= dI ⇔ r∗I(αU , q, rU , zU) =
dI
q
, (I.7)
which can always be supported as an equilibrium and is even unique if the
uninformed creditor has given a credit (zU = 1) and if YH − rU − r∗I > 0
holds. If YH − rU − r∗I ≤ 0 holds, the entrepreneur makes zero profits
anyway. For convenience, let us assume that then I and E play (I.6) and
(I.7), too.
Again, U anticipates the equilibrium values r∗I , z
∗
I . In any equilibrium,
she accepts any offer that promises her a strictly positive payoff and
rejects any offer if she expects a strictly negative payoff. As before, let
us assume that she also accepts when her expected payoff is zero:
z∗U(αU , rU) =
￿
1 if
￿ 1
0 µ(q, rU) · z∗I · E[φU(αU , rU , r∗I , Y )− dU |q] d q ≥ 0
0 else.
Note that neither r∗I nor z
∗
I are functions of zU , which means that the
expression for z∗U is well-defined. The entrepreneur maximizes max[YH−
r∗U − r∗I , 0]. Observing that r∗I does not depend on rU , we can conclude
that E chooses the lowest value of rU that is accepted by U . If she rejects
any offer, the entrepreneur is of course indifferent between the offers:
r∗U(αU , q) ∈ argmax
z∗U(αU , rU)
rU
, (I.8)
which can even be supported as an equilibrium if YH−r∗U−r∗I ≤ 0 holds.
Given (I.8), there is a threshold, above which all and below which no
project is financed by the informed creditor. Let us denote this threshold
for given rU as qL(αU , rU |dU > YL). Observe that the informed creditor
can break even if dI/q + rU ≤ YH holds. Hence, the threshold is given
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by:
qL(αU , rU |dU > YL) = dI
YH − rU . (I.9)
Unfortunately, any level of rU can be supported as an equilibrium be-
cause the uninformed creditor may assign arbitrarily low values of q to
any rU off the equilibrium path. At this point, the argument made in the
one-creditor case kicks in: If all entrepreneurs choose the same rU , it is
safe to assume that the uninformed creditor assigns the same probability
to all types given that a deviation has been observed. Hence, for any rU
off the equilibrium path, U believes￿ 1
qL
E[φU(αU , rU , rI =
dI
q
, Y )− dU |q] d q
= E[φU(αU , rU , rI =
dI
q
, Y )− dU |q ≥ qL]
to be her payoff. Note that qL is continuous and strictly increasing in rU
and rU is continuous and strictly decreasing in qL. Hence, in equilibrium,
she makes exactly zero profit:
E[φU(αU , rU , r
∗
I , Y )− dU |q ≥ qL(αU , rU |dU > YL)] = 0
⇔rU = 2dU − (1− qL)YL
1 + qL
. (I.10)
Combining (I.9) and (I.10) yields the unique equilibrium threshold
q∗L(αU |dU > YL) = −
YH + YL − dU −D
2(YH − YL) (I.11)
+
￿
[YH + YL − dU −D]2 + 4dI(YH − YL)
2(YH − YL) ,
as shown in appendix 1.1. The set of realized projects cannot be empty,
because I accepts only if rI + rU ≤ YH holds, which ensures that U
breaks even. Note that in this equilibrium E ￿s offer r∗I and I
￿s answer z∗I
are unique for all q > q∗L(αU |dU > YL).
To sum up, we can describe the equilibrium as follows:
Essays in the Economic Analysis of Corporate and Public Law 34
Proposition I.4: Under uninformed creditor’s priority and dU > YL,
there exists the following sequential equilibrium:
E: r∗U =
dU − [1− q∗L(αU |dU > YL)]YL
1 + q∗L(αU |dU > YL)
U: z∗U =
￿
1 if E[φU(αU , rU , rI =
dI
q , Y )− dU |q ≥ dIYH−rU ] ≥ 0
0 else
E: r∗I =
dI
q
I: z∗I =
￿
1 if E[φI(αU , rU , rI , Y )|q] ≥ dI
0 else.
The uninformed creditor’s beliefs are µ(q, rU) = 1, ∀q ∈ [0, 1], ∀rU ≥ dU .
In this equilibrium, all projects q ∈ [q∗L(αU |dU > YL), 1] get started.
Observe that the beliefs are consistent (see the one-creditor case).
4.4. Pro-Rata Rule
Recall that under the pro-rata rule, if the repayment claims exceed the
share of the cash flow proportional to the credits, each creditor gets this
share. As the repayment claims must exceed the credits (rU ≥ dU , rI ≥
dI), it is clear that the creditors get dUYL, dIYL in the bad state of the
world. In equilibrium, given any rU , zU , the entrepreneur play according
to the following actions that are equivalent to the full information case:
z∗I (αP , q, rU , rI , zU) =
￿
1 if E[φI(αP , rU , rI , Y )|q] ≥ dI
0 else
(I.12)
qr∗I + (1− q)φ(αP , rU , rI , YL)￿ ￿￿ ￿
=dIYL
= dI
⇔r∗I(αP , q, rU , zU) =
dI − (1− q)dIYL
q
. (I.13)
These actions can always be supported as an equilibrium and are even
unique if the uninformed creditor has given a credit (zU = 1) and if
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YH − rU − r∗I > 0 holds. Recall that r∗I solves I ￿s zero-profit condition
if she receives indeed r∗I in the good state of the world. If the payment
φI(αP , rU , r∗I , YH) falls short of r
∗
I , which may occur in bankruptcy, a
further increase in rI does not increase her payoff, in which case she
cannot break even.
Again, we assume that the uninformed creditor accepts any offer that
yields her at least zero profit:
z∗U(αP , rU) =
￿
1 if
￿ 1
0 µ(q, rU) · z∗I · E[φU(αP , rU , r∗I , Y )− dU |q] d q ≥ 0
0 else.
Note that this expression is well-defined as neither r∗I (see (I.13)) nor
z∗I (see (I.12)) are functions of zU . As r
∗
I does not depend on rU , the
entrepreneur offers the least value of rU that is accepted by U :
r∗U(αP , q) ∈ argmax
z∗U(αP , rU)
rU
, (I.8)
which can even be supported as an equilibrium if YH − r∗U − r∗I ≤ 0
holds. Given that all entrepreneurs offer the same rU , there is again
a threshold above which the informed creditor finances all and below
which she finances no project. Note that in the good state, the informed
creditor can ensure herself a payment of dIYH . Hence, she can finance
all projects q ≥ qSO independent of rU . Additionally, she can finance all
projects for which rU + r∗I ≤ YH holds. Hence, the threshold is given by
qL(αP , rU) = min
￿
qSO,
dI(1− YL)
max(YH − rU , dI)− dIYL
￿
, (I.14)
where max−function prevents that the second argument of the min−function
exceeds 1. U ￿s payoff is given by
E[φU(αP , rU , r
∗
I , Y )− dU |q ≥ qL(αP , rU)].
Again, we employ the above refinement criterion which implies that U ￿s
perceived payoff off the equilibrium path belief is equal to her payoff if it
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was offered by all types. Observe that U ￿s expected payoff is continuous
and strictly increasing in qL and that the threshold is continuous and
weakly decreasing in rU . Hence, U makes zero profit in equilibrium:￿ 1
qL(αP ,rU )
[qr∗U − (1− q)
=dUYL￿ ￿￿ ￿
(αP , rU , r
∗
I , YL)] = 0
⇔ r∗U =
2dU − [1− qL(αP , rU)] dUYL
1 + qL(αP , rU)
. (I.15)
Combining (I.14) and (I.15) yields the unique equilibrium threshold
q∗L(αP ) = −
YH − 2dU + YLdU − dI
2(YH − YL) (I.16)
+
￿￿
YH − 2dU + YLdU − dI
2(YH − YL)
￿2
+
dI − dIYL
YH − YL ,
as shown in appendix 1.2. In equilibrium, U must break even, because
I accepts on the equilibrium path if r∗I + r
∗
U ≤ YH holds. Hence, the set
of realized projects is nonempty and the actions according to (I.12) and
(I.13) are unique for all q > q∗L(αP ). We establish:
Proposition I.5: Under the pro-rata rule, there is the following sequen-
tial equilibrium:
E: r∗U =
2dU − [1− q∗L(αP )] dUYL
1 + q∗L(αP )
U: z∗U =
￿
1 if E[φU(αP , rU ,
dI−(1−q)dIYL
q , Y )− dU |q ≥ qL(αP , rU)] ≥ 0
0 else
E: r∗I =
dI − (1− q)dIYL
q
I: z∗I =
￿
1 if E[φI(αP , rU , rI , Y )|q] ≥ dI
0 else.
The uninformed creditor’s beliefs are µ(q, rU) = 1, ∀q ∈ [0, 1], ∀rU ≥ dU .
In this equilibrium, all projects q ∈ [q∗(αP ), 1] are realized.
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4.5. Informed Creditor’s Priority
If the informed creditor is served first in bankruptcy, she receives min(Y, rI).
Note that I ￿s payoff does not depend on rU . Again, the entrepreneur
makes the informed creditor an offer such that she exactly breaks even,
which she accepts:
z∗I (αI , q, rU , rI , zU) =
￿
1 if E[φI(αI , rU , rI , Y )|q] ≥ dI
0 else
(I.17)
r∗I(αI , q, rU , zU) =
dI − (1− q)min[dI , YL]
q
, (I.18)
which can always be supported as an equilibrium and is even unique if the
uninformed creditor has given a credit (zU = 1) and if YH − rU − r∗I > 0
holds. As I ￿s payoff does not depend on rU , we can directly infer the
equilibrium threshold. She finances all projects with qYH+(1−q)YL ≥ dI ,
which means:
q∗L(αI) = max
￿
dI − YL
YH − YL , 0
￿
.
If dI ≤ YL holds, I bears no default risk, and hence, r∗I = dI holds in
equilibrium. In this case, I finances all projects. If her credit exceeds
the cash flow in the bad state (dI > YL), she funds the project if the
expected cash flow is greater than her credit.
Again, in equilibrium, let us assume that the uninformed creditor ac-
cepts whenever she expects at least zero profit and that E chooses the
lowest value of rU which is accepted by her:
z∗U(αI , rU) =
￿
1 if E[φU(αI , rU , r∗I , Y )− dU |q ≥ q∗L(αI)] ≥ 0
0 else
r∗U(αI , q) ∈ argmax
z∗U(αI , rU)
rU
. (I.8)
Note that the expression for z∗U(αI , rU) is well-defined as neither r
∗
I nor
q∗L(αI) depend on zU . Again, (I.8) can even be supported as an equi-
librium if YH − r∗U − r∗I ≤ 0 holds. If the projects for which I grants
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a credit (q ∈ [q∗L(αI), 1]) are not profitable on average, there is no offer
that U accepts in equilibrium because she makes a loss in expectation.
If these projects are, by contrast, profitable on average, she may break
even. Although the set of realized projects does not depend on how much
profit the uninformed creditor makes, for convenience, let us again choose
the value of rU that leads to zero profit for the uninformed creditor. If
dI ≤ YL holds, the explicit solution for r∗U is quite simple:￿ 1
0
qr∗U + (1− q)(YL − dI) d q = dU ⇔ r∗U = 2dU + dI − YL.
Note that in this case, all entrepreneur types make a strictly positive
profit in expectation, which implies that r∗I and z
∗
I are unique given
the entrepreneur’s offer to the uninformed creditor and her answer. By
contrast, if the low cash flow is not sufficient to pay back I ￿s loan in
full, the solution for r∗U is difficult to calculate because bankruptcy also
occurs in the good state of the world for intermediate values of q.19 We
establish:
Proposition I.6: Under informed creditor’s priority, there is the fol-
lowing sequential equilibrium:
E: r∗U(αI , q) ∈ argmax
z∗U(αI , rU)
rU
U: z∗U =
￿
1 if E[φU(αI , rU ,
dI−(1−q)min[dI ,YL]
q , Y )− dU |q ≥ q∗L(αI)] ≥ 0
0 else
E: r∗I =
dI − (1− q)min[dI , YL]
q
.
I: z∗I =
￿
1 if E[φI(αI , rU , rI , Y )|q] ≥ dI
0 else.
The uninformed creditor’s beliefs are µ(q, rU) = 1, ∀q ∈ [0, 1], ∀rU ≥ dU .
In equilibrium, either all q ∈ [q∗(αI), 1] or none of the projects are
realized.
19Note that in this case the actions according to (I.17) and (I.18) are not unique. However, in order
to allow a comparison to the other cases, we assume that in that case, the projects are realized.
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Note that if the informed creditor finances all projects, the result is
the same as in the case of one uninformed creditor. Consequently, in
this case, information on the market is lost.
4.6. Welfare comparison
Now, we are to compare the different rules with respect to their welfare
properties. This is quite simple because welfare is only a function of the
set of realized projects. Hence, we compare the cutoff-values for each
of the rules and show that, generally, the equilibrium threshold q∗L(α) is
too low:
Proposition I.7: If the set of realized projects is nonempty, then q∗L(α) ≤
qSO, i.e., too many projects are financed.
Proof. See appendix 1.3.
Intuitively spoken, U receives dU on average. However, the ex ante
expected payment from low q−types to the uninformed creditor is gen-
erally lower than dU . Hence, I can break even, although the project
promises a negative net cash flow. The loss is borne by the uninformed
creditor, who, in turn, receives a higher interest rate, which must be
paid by all entrepreneurs. This indicates, too, that, compared to the full
information case, there is a transfer of wealth from the good to the bad
types.
Furthermore we can rank the bankruptcy rules with respect to their
welfare properties:
Proposition I.8: From a welfare perspective, the uninformed creditor’s
priority rule is best, followed by the pro-rata rule, which, in turn, out-
performs informed creditor’s priority.
Proof. If no projects are realized under informed creditor’s priority,
welfare is equal to 0. In all other cases, welfare must be greater or bigger
than 0 because if it was smaller than 0, at least one of the creditors
Essays in the Economic Analysis of Corporate and Public Law 40
could not break even. Welfare is given by
￿ 1
q∗L(α)
[qYH + (1 − q)YL]dq =
1
2 [(YH−YL)−q∗L(α)2(YH−YL)]+(1−q∗L(α))(YL−D) and is a symmetric
and strictly concave function of the threshold q∗L(α). Therefore the larger￿￿￿q∗L(α)− D−YLYH−YL ￿￿￿, the lower the welfare.
As in all cases q∗L(α) ≤ qSO, we know that the greater the threshold,
the better the results from a welfare perspective. For the calculations,
see appendix 1.4.
On intuitive grounds, the more priority U gets, the less important is
the informational asymmetry and the less is I ￿s incentive to finance so-
cially inefficient projects. The same is true for the transfer of wealth:
Under informed creditor’s priority and dI ≤ YL, all types have the same
credit contracts. At the other extreme, i.e., uninformed creditor’s pri-
ority and dU ≤ YL, the outcome is equal to the full information case,
which implies that there is no transfer at all. Hence, the inefficient use
of information can justify the existence of the equitable subordination
doctrine.
4.7. Performance of Equity Contracts
Finally, let us consider equity contracts as a benchmark. For instance,
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that equity financing is best in asym-
metric information frameworks.
Suppose I and U are not offered debt, but equity contracts, i.e., they
receive a fixed share, denoted xj, in any state of the world. This implies
that the investors receive xUY, xIY in either state of the world. Hence,
bankruptcy cannot occur. We assume that U is guaranteed her share xU :
If xI +xU > 1 holds, the informed investor only gets a share of 1−xU .20
Let this case be denoted by αE.
Given any xU , zU , E makes I an offer such that she exactly breaks
20If we had not this assumption, the result would be equal to that of I ￿s priority, because for any xU ,
xI could be set such that I receives (nearly) everything.
Essays in the Economic Analysis of Corporate and Public Law 41
even, which she accepts:
z∗I (αE, q, xU , xI , zU) =
￿
1 if E[φI(αE, xU , xI , Y )|q] ≥ dI
0 else
(I.19)
x∗I(αE, q, xU , zU) =
dI
qYH + (1− q)YL .
This can always be supported as an equilibrium and is even unique if the
uninformed investor has given a credit (zU = 1) and if x∗I+xU < 1 holds.
Anticipating this, the uninformed creditor accepts any offer that yields
her at least zero profit in expectation, and the entrepreneur chooses the
lowest value of xU accepted by her:
z∗U(αE, xU) =
￿
1 if
￿ 1
0 µ(q, rU) · z∗I · E[φU(αI , rU , x∗I , Y )− dU |q] ≥ 0
0 else
x∗U(αI , q) ∈ argmax
z∗U(αE, xU)
xU
.
Note that z∗U is well-defined as neither r
∗
I nor z
∗
I are functions of zU . The
value for x∗U can even be supported as an equilibrium if YH−x∗U−x∗I ≤ 0
holds. Given that all types offer the same xU , there is again a threshold
above which all and below which none are carried out. It is given by
dI
qL(αE, xU)YH + (1− qL(αE, xU))YL + xU = 1 (I.20)
⇔qL(αE, xU) = dI − (1− xU)YL
(1− xU)(YH − YL) . (I.21)
Again, any level of xU can be supported as an equilibrium. Given the
threshold, U ￿s payoff is given by
1 + qL(αE, x∗U)
2
x∗UYH +
1− qL(αE, x∗U)
2
x∗UYL (I.22)
Note that U ￿s profit is continuous and strictly increasing in the threshold
and that the threshold is continuous and strictly decreasing in xU (I.21).
Hence, in equilibrium, U makes zero profit:
1 + qL(αE, x∗U)
2
x∗UYH +
1− qL(αE, x∗U)
2
x∗UYL = dU (I.23)
⇔ x∗U =
2du
[1 + qL(αE, x∗U)]YH + [1− qL(αE, x∗U)]YL
. (I.24)
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Combining (I.20) and (I.24) yields the unique equilibrium threshold:
q∗L(αE) =
1
2 (D + dU − YH) +
￿
1
4(D + dU − YH)2 + YHdI − YL
YH − YL , (I.25)
as shown in appendix 1.5. We can conclude that
Proposition I.9: Under equity financing, there is the following sequen-
tial equilibrium:
E: x∗U =
2du
[1 + q∗L(αE)]YH + [1− q∗L(αE)]YL
U: z∗U =
￿
1 if E[φU(αE, xU ,
dI
qYH+(1−q)YL , Y )− dU |q ≥ qL(αE, xU)] ≥ 0
0 else
E: x∗I =
dI
qYH + (1− q)YL
I: z∗I =
￿
1 if qmin[xI , 1− xU ]YH + (1− q)min[xI , 1− xU ]YL ≥ dI
0 else.
The uninformed investor’s beliefs are µ(q, rU) = 1, ∀q ∈ [0, 1], ∀rU ≥ dU .
We can make the following statement about the welfare properties of
equity financing, which is established in appendix 1.6:
Proposition I.10: Equity contracts perform better than informed cred-
itor’s priority, but worse than the pro-rata rule.
Equity financing performs better than informed creditor’s priority be-
cause the informed creditor is more likely to suffer from financing of inef-
ficient projects. Compared to the pro-rata rule, equity is worse because
for the pivotal type qL, the informed creditor/investor receives relatively
much compared to a debt contract where her share is determined by dIYL
in bankruptcy for all types. Compared to informed creditor’s priority,
she receives relatively little. Hence, the results are better than under
informed creditor’s priority.
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5. Conclusion
This chapter provides an additional justification for rules that subordi-
nate owners’ loans in bankruptcy: In an asymmetric information frame-
work, where one creditor is fully informed about the project but the other
is not, it is best to serve the uninformed party first in bankruptcy. In this
case, information on the market is best used. The more the uninformed
creditor receives in bankruptcy, the less severe the informational asym-
metry. Then the informed creditor finances socially inefficient projects
to a lesser extent or even not at all.
Thus, adverse selection can serve as an additional justification for the
equitable subordination doctrine. This replenishes previous literature in
this field, which justified this rule with moral hazard behavior after the
contract has been made. In contrast to this chapter, the moral hazard
approach only finds ambiguous results about the desirability of those
rules.
In the introduction we discussed the question why the apparently de-
sirable requalification should be mandatory law. Obviously, the legislator
fears that such agreements will not work in practice. So far, however,
there is not much theoretical background to this issue. The question how
the stakeholders of a firm could distribute its cash flows in a more sophis-
ticated way than just relying on equity and debt is not only important
to the rules of equitable subordination.
Another difficult issue is of course, which criteria should be used as
a proxy for superior information. German law stipulates a mandatory
subordination of claims of owners of at least 10 % of the shares. Other
possible criteria could include being part of the same corporate group
or a long-lasting commercial relationship. However, as in reality the
information environments tend to be more complex, this is an interesting
question for future research.
II. Economic Analysis of
Taking Rules: the
Bilateral Case
The analysis focuses on a situation where a landowner
and the government invest prior to the govern-
ment’s taking decision. When the government suffers
from budgetary “fiscal illusion”, optimal compensation
amounts to the hypothetical value of the landowner’s
property had she invested efficiently. In contrast, un-
der a government that maximizes social welfare, the
only regime to induce the first best grants as compen-
sation the social benefit of the taking. Consequently,
if the government can only raise capital up to a cer-
tain amount, society may be better off under a non-
benevolent government.
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1. Introduction
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states “[...]nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion”. This and corresponding clauses in other legal systems, referred
to as eminent domain, expropriations, or takings, have not only gener-
ated an enormous amount of legal cases, but have also been examined
by economists.1 Besides the basic question about the justification for
eminent domain2, economists and legal scholars are interested in how
optimal compensation should look like. Whereas legal scholars often
point out justice arguments3, the economic literature focuses on the in-
vestment incentives of the victim of a taking, often a landowner. In
a provocative article, Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984), who as-
sume that the government acts to maximize social welfare, show that
zero compensation often leads to efficient investment incentives for the
landowner. Fair market value compensation induces, however, ex ante
overinvestment in private property. The intuition is that the poten-
tial victim is fully insured and does not take those states of the world
into account where a taking is socially desirable. Scholars have, since
then, challenged the result that no compensation outperforms fair mar-
ket value compensation. A straightforward argument is that risk averse
1Economists emphasize that “a taking” not only captures physical acquisitions. So called regulatory
takings, e.g., modifying approach paths of an airport, must also be considered as a taking insofar
as they may lower the value of property Hermalin (1995), pp. 64 f., Kaplow (1986), for an overview
of cases, cf. Miceli and Segerson (1994).
2The common justification for this form of compulsory exchange can be found in the hold-out problem
(see Cohen (1991); Goldberg, Merrill, and Unumb (1986); Miceli and Segerson (2007a)). Consider,
as an example, that several parcels of land are required for a public project. In absence of eminent
domain, owners have an incentive to delay their sale in order to extract parts of the project’s
social surplus. Munch (1976) challenges the desirability of eminent domain, claiming that it may
cause increased transaction costs. Shavell (2010) finds, however, that eminent domain is socially
desirable if the quantity of parcels is sufficiently large and the government does not know their
private value.
3Many scholars argue that, even if a government exercises its power of eminent domain to maximize
social welfare, it is necessary to compensate for the loss suffered by the taking (see e.g., Michelman
(1967)).
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individuals are not able to insure themselves against takings due to mar-
ket failure. Consequently, the government has to provide insurance in
the form of compensation (see e.g., Blume and Rubinfeld (1984), pp.
582 ff. and Calandrillo (2005)). Other articles point out “demoralization
costs” that accrue to potential losers “from the realization that no com-
pensation is offered” (Fischel and Shapiro (1988); Michelman (1967), p.
1214).
An important branch of the literature assumes that the government
suffers from “fiscal illusion”, i.e., the perceived cost of a taking is identi-
cal to compensation.4 In such frameworks, an important motive behind
compensation is to influence the government’s behavior. As a notewor-
thy example, Hermalin (1995) demonstrates, in a setting where only the
landowner invests, that compensation should amount to the social ben-
efit of the taking. Alternatively, related to the famous COASE (1960)
theorem, the first best can also be achieved if the landowner has to
compensate the government in absence of a taking. In both situations,
the landowner maximizes expected social welfare and therefore has effi-
cient incentives to invest. Tideman and Plassmann (2005) argue that
the announcement of a taking is already a partial taking unless the
owner is fully compensated. In their framework, the government has
to compensate for this partial taking to ensure fairness and to induce
the government to make the efficient announcement. A large branch of
the literature considers the so called constitutional choice approach to
eminent domain (cf. Fischel and Shapiro (1989); Innes (1997); Miceli
(2008); Nosal (2001)). Individual landowners, acting from behind a veil
of ignorance, choose compensation law without knowing which parcels
of land will be taken. Compensation is financed by a tax levied onto
the property value. The main insight gained from this approach is that
overinvestment incentives generated by compensation regimes are often
4This may be the case if the government’s behavior is driven by lobbyism. Bell (2009) argues that
the economic analysis of eminent domain also applies to situations where the state is not even
involved.
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canceled out because tax makes investment in property less attractive.
This chapter goes one step further than Hermalin (1995). If the gov-
ernment suffers from fiscal illusion and therefore has non-benevolent mo-
tives, it makes sense to consider a situation where not only the landowner,
but also the government may invest ex ante. Whereas the landowner in-
vests to increase the value of her property, the government invests to
increase the expected social benefit of the taking. As an example, the
landowner may invest in a new fodder silo or storehouse whereas the gov-
ernment may invest to gather information on how to use the landowner’s
property as a disposal site for nuclear waste. Other examples include a
government that invests to connect the landowner’s property to the exist-
ing road and rail network or a government that uses its power of eminent
domain on behalf of an airport. If the government is non-benevolent,
compensation regimes thus influence both investment decisions and also
the ex post taking decision of the government. Suffering from fiscal illu-
sion, it initiates a taking whenever the amount of compensation it has
to pay is less or equal than the social benefit of the taking.
We find, as our main result, that compensation should be based on
the hypothetical value of the landowner’s property had she invested ef-
ficiently. Under this regime, the common problem that the landowner
overinvests to reduce the probability of a taking or to increase compen-
sation does not occur. Consequently, the landowner has an incentive to
choose the socially best response to the investment of the government.
The government, in turn, internalizes the benefit of its investment in
exactly the same states as in the social optimum and thus is a residual
claimant of the bilateral relationship. In equilibrium, both parties have
efficient incentives to invest. This result can be related to the economic
analysis of contract law where it is well-known that the legal breach
remedy of expectation damages, if based on socially optimal investment,
induces an efficient breach decision and efficient investment incentives
(Cooter (1985), p. 18; Schweizer (2005), pp. 250 ff.). In contrast, the
most commonly proposed compensation regimes perform poorly. If no
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compensation is paid, the government initiates too many takings and,
hence, the landowner underinvests in her property. This result stands in
contrast to Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984) where, if the taking
decision depends on the landowner’s investment, the no compensation
regime induces overinvestment. The compensation regime proposed by
Hermalin (1995) that grants as compensation the social benefit of the
taking, henceforth social benefit compensation regime, induces the gov-
ernment to not invest at all because it does not internalize any benefit
of its investment.
As a benchmark, we consider the situation that the government acts
benevolently, i.e., maximizes expected social welfare. We establish, un-
der plausible assumptions, that the social benefit compensation regime is
the only regime to generally induce the first best. This result leads to an
interesting implication. If the government can only raise capital up to an
amount below the social benefit, no optimal compensation regime may
be available. Consequently, society may be better off if the government
suffers from fiscal illusion.
An important contribution of this chapter is to present a generally
applicable machinery that does not require differentiability and does not
impose assumptions on the shape of distribution functions. This ma-
chinery allows us to derive our results in a simple but elegant way.5
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce our
model of bilateral investment. We then analyze under the assumption
that the government is non-benevolent the efficiency of different compen-
sation regimes in section 3. In section 4, we consider, as a benchmark,
the situation that the government is benevolent. Section 5 concludes.
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Figure II.1.: Timeline of the model
2. The model
We consider a model with two risk-neutral parties. A landowner, also
referred to as“she”, faces the risk that in the future the government or“it”
may take her property in order to provide a public good6 (see Figure II.1).
At date 0, before it is known whether a taking occurs, the landowner may
invest to increase the expected private value of her property. Likewise,
the government invests to increase the expected social value of the public
good. We denote the cost of their investments by eL ∈ [0, emaxL ] and
eG ∈ [0, emaxG ], respectively, and assume that investment is asset-specific.
If the government does not take the landowner’s property, its investment
is lost whereas the landowner’s investment is beneficial only in absence
of a taking. As an example, consider a farmer who may invest in a
new fodder silo or a storehouse. The government may consider using
the farmer’s land to construct a repository for nuclear waste. Here, the
government invests to obtain information about the nature of the ground
and to tailor the repository to the geologic conditions of the area. At
date 1, the state of the world ω ∈ Ω is realized. Hence, the landowner’s
private valuation of her property (1 − q)V (eL,ω), the social value of
the public good qS(eG,ω) and the amount of compensation to be paid
qC(eL, eG,ω), values that depend on the government’s taking decision
5The machinery of the present chapter is closely related to the one used in Go¨ller (2011), a paper that
analyzes the efficiency of expectation damages in a situation of bilateral cooperative investment.
6The two defining properties of a public good, non-rivalry and non-excludability, are not crucial for
our analysis. Therefore, the term “public good” must not be understood in a narrow sense, but
describes any good provided by public authorities.
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q ∈ {0, 1}, become commonly known. In this decision, to be made at
date 2, q = 0 means that the landowner keeps her property whereas
q = 1 implies that it is taken and the public good is supplied. Thus, the
property can either be used by the landowner or the government, but
not by both at the same time. We assume that the government cannot
ex ante commit on an ex post taking decision and that the landowner
does not draw utility from the provision of the public good.7 In the next
section, we consider the case that the government initiates a taking if
the amount of compensation it has to pay does not exceed the potential
social value of the public good. In contrast, we assume in section 4 that
the government takes the property whenever it is socially desirable to
do so. Finally, at date 3, the payoffs are realized. We discuss them in
detail in section 3 and 4, for both the non-benevolent and the benevolent
government, respectively. Throughout this chapter, we assume that all
information but investment is common knowledge and use the following
notation and assumptions:
Assumption 1 For any eL ∈ [0, emaxL ], eG ∈ [0, emaxG ] and ω ∈ Ω,
V (eL,ω) > 0 and S(eG,ω) > 0.
Assumption 2 For any ω ∈ Ω, V (eL,ω) is monotonically increas-
ing in eL and S(eG,ω) is monotonically increasing in eG.
It directly follows from Assumption 2 that the probability that the value
of the public good exceeds the landowner’s private valuation of her prop-
erty is increasing in eG and decreasing in eL. Let us denote the ex post
social surplus minus investment by
W (eL, eG,ω, q) = qS(eG,ω) + (1− q)V (eL,ω)− eL − eG.
7The potential value of the public good to society, S(eG,ω), can also be understood as the so-
cial benefit of the taking. This expression should not be confused with the social net benefit,
qS(eG,ω)− (1− q)V (eL,ω).
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For given investments eL, eG and state of the world ω, it is maximized
by the socially efficient taking decision
q∗(eL, eG,ω) ∈ argmax
q∈{0,1}
W (eL, eG,ω, q).
This implies that a benevolent social planner would take the landowner’s
property, q = 1, whenever the social benefit of the taking is at least as
high as the landowner’s valuation of her property, S(eG,ω) ≥ V (eL,ω).
We assume that the efficient investment levels, denoted (e∗L,e
∗
G), uniquely
maximize the expected social surplus
E[W (eL, eG,ω, q
∗(eL, eG,ω))]
in [0, emaxL ] × [0, emaxG ] contingent on an efficient taking decision. Let
us consider two more benchmarks that will prove useful for our analysis.
First, we are interested in the landowner’s optimal investment in absence
of the risk of a taking. This private optimal level, denoted epL, uniquely
maximizes
E[V (eL,ω)]− eL (II.1)
in [0, emaxL ]. Second, let us consider the case that a taking is always
desirable from a social perspective. Then, the government’s socially
optimal investment level, denoted epG, uniquely maximizes
E[S(eG,ω)]− eG
in [0, emaxG ]. It is straightforward to show that e
p
L ≥ e∗L and epG ≥ e∗G (see
Appendix 2.1).
3. Non-benevolent government
As correctly observed by Hermalin (1995), one important motive behind
the demand for just compensation is to restrain the government from
the tyrannical use of its right of eminent domain. The underlying idea
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is that a government often acts on behalf of the interest of the majority
essentially ignoring the interest of a single property owner.8 In this sec-
tion, we analyze how commonly proposed compensation regimes perform
with respect to efficiency. A regime is socially optimal if the efficient ex
post taking decision by the government and, contingent on that, efficient
bilateral investment can be established as an equilibrium. We find that
the first best is attainable by a regime that grants as compensation the
potential value of the landowner’s property had she invested e∗L ex ante.
The non-benevolent government internalizes the benefit of the public
good but may have to bear compensation costs.9 Its ex post payoffminus
investment is given by
UG(eL, eG,ω, q) = q[S(eG,ω)− C(eL, eG,ω)]− eG.
For given investments (eL,eG) and state of the world ω, the government’s
taking decision solves
QG(eL, eG,ω) ∈ argmax
q∈{0,1}
UG(eL, eG,ω, q).
Hence, the government initiates a taking whenever the value of the pub-
lic good exceeds the amount of compensation it has to pay. If a taking
occurs, the landowner receives compensation. If not, she enjoys the ben-
efit of her property. Her ex post payoff minus investment thus amounts
to
UL(eL, eG,ω, q) = (1− q)V (eL,ω) + qC(eL, eG,ω)− eL.
We can now define the government’s private best response to investment
of the landowner as
eBRG (eL) := argmax
eG∈[0,emaxG ]
E[UG(eL, eG,ω, Q
G(eL, eG,ω))]
8As an alternative motivation, consider that the power of eminent domain is often used not in order
to provide a public good but in the interest of a private enterprise. In the legal literature, there
is a debate about whether such takings fulfill the public use requirement, cf. Kelly (2006) and
Pritchett (2003).
9Recall that the government neglects the landowner’s interest and therefore does not take the
landowner’s benefit of compensation into account.
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and the landowner’s private best response to investment of the govern-
ment as
eBRL (eG) := argmax
eL∈[0,emaxL ]
E[UL(eL, eG,ω, Q
G(eL, eG,ω))].
Moreover, we define the socially best response to investment of the
landowner as
eSBRG (eL) := argmax
eG∈[0,emaxG ]
E[W (eL, eG,ω, Q
G(eL, eG,ω))]
and the socially best response to investment of the government as
eSBRL (eG) := argmax
eL∈[0,emaxL ]
E[W (eL, eG,ω, Q
G(eL, eG,ω))].
In United States Case Law, just compensation is usually interpreted as
fair market value (Miceli and Segerson (2007b), p. 277). Let us interpret
fair market value as the value of the landowner’s property in absence of
a taking, C(eL, eG,ω) = V (eL,ω). Under a regime that grants fair mar-
ket value, henceforth full compensation regime (see Blume, Rubinfeld,
and Shapiro (1984)), the landowner’s ex post payoff minus investment
amounts to
UFCL (eL, eG,ω, q) = V (eL,ω)− eL.
The government’s payoff amounts to ex post social surplus minus the
landowner’s payoff. It is given by
UFCG (eL, eG,ω, q) = W (eL, eG,ω, q)− [V (eL,ω)− eL] =
q[S(eG,ω)− V (eL,ω)]− eG.
We can derive the following proposition:
Proposition II.1: Under the full compensation regime, in any subgame-
perfect equilibrium: (i) The government’s taking decision is efficient,
QG(eL, eG,ω) = q∗(eL, eG,ω). (ii) The landowner invests as if there
was no risk of taking and irrespectively of the government’s investment,
eBRL (eG) = e
p
L ≥ e∗L for all eG ∈ [0, emaxG ]. (iii) The government chooses
a socially best response to the landowner’s investment, eG ∈ eSBRG (epL).
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Proof. (i) The government’s taking decision is efficient, QG(eL, eG,ω) =
q∗(eL, eG,ω), because it initiates a taking whenever S(eG,ω) ≥ V (eL,ω).
(ii) The second statement is true because the landowner’s expected pay-
off
E[V (eL,ω)]− eL
is equivalent to the one in absence of the risk of a taking (see equation
(II.1)). (iii) Taking into account the landowner’s investment and its own
ex post taking decision, QG(eL, eG,ω) = q∗(eL, eG,ω), the government’s
expected payoff is given by
E[W (epL, eG,ω, q
∗(epL, eG,ω))]− E[V (epL,ω)] + eL.
Since E[V (epL,ω)]−eL does not depend on the government’s investment,
it chooses a socially best response to the landowner’s investment.
For the landowner, we get the same overinvestment result as in Blume,
Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984). She overinvests because she is fully in-
sured and hence does not take those states of the world into account
where a taking is socially desirable. The government, however, chooses
the efficient ex post taking decision and even the socially best response to
the landowner’s investment. This is the case because the government is in
the position of a residual claimant of the bilateral relationship. It receives
total social surplus minus the value of the landowner’s property, a term
that is constant with respect to the government’s investment. Thus, even
though the landowner overinvests, the full compensation regime may not
be as undesirable as in Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984).
Perhaps the best known result of Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro
(1984) is that if no compensation is paid, the first best can be attained if
the landowner’s investment does not influence the probability of a taking.
Under the no compensation regime, the landowner’s ex post payoff
minus investment amounts to
UNCL (eL, eG,ω, q) = (1− q)V (eL,ω)− eL.
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Since the government has to pay no compensation and neglects the
landowner’s interest, its payoff is given by
UNCG (eL, eG,ω, q) = qS(eG,ω)− eG
= W (eL, eG,ω, q)− (1− q)V (eL,ω) + eL.
We can establish the following proposition:
Proposition II.2: Under the no compensation regime, in any subgame-
perfect equilibrium: (i) The government always takes the landowner’s
property, QG(eL, eG,ω) = 1. (ii) Consequently, the landowner does not
invest at all, eBRL (eG) = 0 for all eG ∈ [0, emaxG ]. (iii) The government
chooses a socially best response to the landowner’s investment, eG ∈
eSBRG (0).
Proof. (i) The first claim is true because S(eG,ω) is strictly greater
than zero. (ii) Because the landowner’s expected payoff is equivalent to
E[UNCL (eL, eG,ω, 1)] = −eL,
she does not invest at all. (iii) Taking into account the landowner’s
investment and its own ex post taking decision, QG(eL, eG,ω) = 1, the
government’s expected payoff is given by
E[W (0, eG,ω, 1)]− E[0V (0,ω)] + eL = E[W (0, eG,ω, 1)] + eL.
Thus, given that a taking occurs with certainty, the government plays a
socially best response.
In contrast to Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984), the no compen-
sation regime performs poorly in our setting. The government always
takes the landowner’s property and therefore induces her to not invest
at all. The government’s investment corresponds to our third bench-
mark where a taking is always socially desirable, eBRG (eL) = e
p
G. Note
that epG is generally not a socially best response to efficient investment
of the landowner (see Appendix 2.1). It is, however, an optimal choice
if takings occur with certainty.
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Hermalin (1995) shows, in a setting where the state is non-benevolent
but only the landowner invests, that the first best can be induced by
a regime that grants the landowner as compensation the social benefit
of the taking, C(eL, eG,ω) = S(eG,ω). Under this regime, henceforth
social benefit compensation regime, the landowner’s ex post payoffminus
investment amounts to
USBCL (eL, eG,ω, q) = (1− q)V (eL,ω)+qS(eG,ω)− eL
=W (eL, eG,ω, q) + eG.
And hence the government’s payoff is given by
USBCG (eL, eG,ω, q) = −eG.
In principle, the government is indifferent between initiating a taking or
not. We can then establish the following proposition:
Proposition II.3: Under the social benefit compensation regime, as-
suming that the government initiates a taking whenever it is socially
desirable, we can establish the following subgame-perfect equilibrium out-
come. (i) The government does not invest at all, eBRG (eL) = 0 for all eL ∈
[0, emaxL ]. (ii) The landowner’s best response is equivalent to the socially
best response, eBRL (0) = e
SBR
L (0).
Proof. (i) Obvious. (ii) The landowner’s expected payoff amounts to
E[W (eL, 0,ω, q
∗(0, eL,ω))] + eG.
Hence, she chooses the socially optimal best response.
In contrast to Hermalin (1995), the social benefit compensation regime
performs poorly in our setting. The government does not internalize any
benefit of its investment and thus has no incentive to invest. Suppose
that the landowner receives as compensation some fraction α ∈ (0, 1)
from the social benefit of the taking. Because (1 − α)S(eG,ω) > 0,
the non-benevolent government always initiates a taking. Since the
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landowner’s investment does not influence the value of the public good,
she has no incentive to invest.
We have established that all standard compensation regimes fail to
induce the first best. Consider a regime, henceforth referred to as so-
cial optimal property value compensation regime, where the landowner
receives as compensation the hypothetical value of her property had
she invested efficiently, C(eL, eG,ω) = V (e∗L,ω). Under this regime, the
landowner receives:
USOPV CL (eL, eG,ω, q) = (1− q)V (eL,ω) + qV (e∗L,ω)− eL
= W (eL, eG,ω, q)− qS(eG,ω) + qV (e∗L,ω) + eG.
Consequently, the government’s payoff is given by
USOPV CG (eL, eG,ω, q) = q[S(eG,ω)− V (e∗L,ω)]− eG
= qS(eG,ω)− V (e∗L,ω) + (1− q)V (e∗L,ω)− eG
= W (e∗L, eG,ω, q)− V (e∗L,ω) + e∗L.
This allows us to establish the main proposition of this chapter:
Proposition II.4: Under the social optimal property value compensa-
tion regime, the socially efficient investment levels (e∗L, e
∗
G) and the so-
cially efficient ex post taking decision QG(e∗L, e
∗
G,ω) = q
∗(e∗L, e
∗
G,ω) con-
stitute the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome.
Proof. The government initiates a taking whenever S(eG,ω) ≥ V (e∗L,ω).
We can therefore write the government’s ex post taking decision as
QG(eL, eG,ω) = q∗(e∗L, eG,ω).
Let us establish that eG = e∗G is the unique best response to any
investment of the landowner. The government’s expected payoff is given
by
E[W (e∗L, eG,ω, q
∗(e∗L, eG,ω))]− E[V (e∗L,ω)] + e∗L
Because (e∗L, e
∗
G) uniquely maximize expected welfare and−E[V (e∗L,ω)]+
e∗L does not depend on the government’s investment, e
∗
G uniquely maxi-
mizes the government’s expected payoff.
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Given the government’s taking decision and investment, the landowner’s
expected payoff amounts to
E[W (eL, e
∗
G,ω, q
∗(e∗L, e
∗
G,ω))]− E[q∗(e∗L, e∗G,ω)(S(e∗G,ω)− V (e∗L,ω))] + e∗G.
To check that eL = e∗L is the unique best response, we show that it
maximizes
E[W (eL, e∗G,ω, q
∗(e∗L, e
∗
G,ω))]. Take any eL ￿= e∗L, then it must hold that
E[W (e∗L, e
∗
G,ω, q
∗(e∗L, e
∗
G,ω))]
>E[W (eL, e
∗
G,ω, q
∗(eL, e∗G,ω))]
≥E[W (eL, e∗G,ω, q∗(e∗L, e∗G,ω))]. (II.2)
The first inequality follows from e∗L and e
∗
G being unique welfare max-
imizers. The second and the third line of (II.2) only differ in the ex
post taking decision. Because the taking decision is socially optimal and
conditions on true investment in the second line but on e∗L in the third
line, the second inequality must hold. We have established that e∗L is the
unique best response to e∗G, which proves the claim.
The intuition behind our main result is the following. The government
takes the property whenever the compensation it has to pay is less than or
equal to the social benefit of the taking. Since compensation is equivalent
to the hypothetical value of the landowner’s property had she invested
e∗L, the taking decision depends on the government’s but not on the
landowner’s investment. If the government invests eG = e∗G, it initiates a
taking in exactly the same states of the world a benevolent social planner
would do so. Consequently, the landowner internalizes the benefit of
her investment with exactly the same probability as in the first best.
Therefore eL = e∗L is the unique best response to efficient investment
of the government. If the landowner invests efficiently, the government
receives expected social surplus minus the landowner’s benefit, a term
that is constant with respect to the government’s investment. Because
e∗G is the socially best response to e
∗
L, it must also be the best response
for the government.
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Theorem II.1: The investment levels induced by the compensation regimes
discussed in this section can be ranked in the following way:10
∀eL ∈ eSBCL : eFCL = epL ≥ eL ≥ eSOPV CL = e∗L ≥ eNCL = 0 (II.3)
∀eG ∈ eFCG : eNCG = epG ≥ eSOPV CG = e∗G ≥ eG ≥ eSBCG = 0. (II.4)
All regimes other than the SOPVC regime, however, cannot be ranked
with respect to their welfare properties.
Proof. See Appendix 2.2.
Any regime other than the SOPVC regime fails to induce the first best
in different respects. Under different parameter constellations, the size
of these inefficiencies may vary greatly. Hence, any of these regimes may
theoretically outperform the other two. In situations where the ex ante
probability of a taking is low, the full compensation regime performs
reasonably well. The government, even though it is non-benevolent,
chooses a social optimal best response to the landowner’s investment.
The landowner’s overinvestment, which occurs because the landowner
is fully insured and does not take those states of the world into ac-
count where a taking is socially desirable, may be considered negligible.
Proposition 4 suggests that if one believes that the ex ante probability
of a taking is substantial, compensation should not be based on actual
but on socially optimal investment. The complexity of computing first-
best compensation is, however, higher under the social optimal property
value compensation regime. Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984), who
assume that the government is benevolent, derive a related result. If the
government can commit to initiate a taking whenever the social benefit
of the taking is higher than the hypothetical value of the landowner’s
10Here, the notation is as follows. The landowner’s optimal investment level under the full compen-
sation regime is denoted by eFCL . Because the landowner’s optimal investment need not be unique
under the social benefit compensation regime, eSBCL denotes the set of optimal investment levels
under this regime. The remaining variables are defined in a similar way, where SOPVC stands for
social optimal property value compensation and NC for no compensation.
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property had she invested efficiently, any lump sum compensation plan
induces the landowner to invest according to the first best. Thus, the
benevolent government would like to commit itself to exactly the same
ex post taking decision the non-benevolent government chooses out of
its own interest. Next section, we consider the situation that the govern-
ment is benevolent but cannot commit to any ex post taking decision.
4. Benevolent government
In this section, the government’s interest coincides with those of a benev-
olent social planner. We consider a wide class of compensation regimes
and derive that, under certain plausible assumptions, the social benefit
compensation regime is the only one to generally induce the first best.
The government’s ex post payoff minus investment is equivalent to ex
post social welfare minus investment. It is given by
UG(eL, eG,ω, q) = qS(eG,ω) + (1− q)V (eL,ω)− eL − eG.
The government uses its right of eminent domain whenever it is socially
desirable to do so, QG(eL, eG,ω) = q∗(eL, eG,ω). At the investment
stage, it chooses the socially best response to the investment strategy
of the landowner contingent on its own ex post taking decision. Conse-
quently, the first best can be established as an equilibrium whenever the
landowner’s investment constitutes a socially best response to the gov-
ernment’s investment. The landowner’s ex post payoff minus investment
is the same as in the previous section. It amounts to
UL(eL, eG,ω, q) = (1− q)V (eL,ω) + qC(eL, eG,ω)− eL.
In the following, we only consider compensation regimes that are non-
punishing. In any state of the world ω ∈ Ω , the amount of compen-
sation paid to the landowner C(eL, eG,ω), is non-decreasing in eL. The
rationale behind this restriction is that the idea behind compensation
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is to protect but not to punish the landowner. Moreover, let us as-
sume that compensation may not exceed the social benefit of the taking,
C(eL, eG,ω) ≤ S(eG,ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. The government may be wealth-
constrained or public pressure may prevent an exceedingly high amount
of compensation. We establish the following proposition:
Proposition II.5: If compensation is non-punishing and may not ex-
ceed the social benefit of the taking, only the social benefit compensation
regime, C(eL, eG,ω) = S(eG,ω), generally induces the first best. Any
other regime induces that the landowner’s best response to efficient in-
vestment of the government is to overinvest, ∀eL ∈ eBRL (e∗G), eL ≥ e∗L.
Proof. For ease of notation, let us omit the arguments e∗G and ω. The
landowner’s expected payoff is given by
E[UL(eL)] =E[(1−Q∗(eL))V (eL)] + E[Q∗(eL)C(eL)]− eL
=E[W (eL, Q
∗(eL))]− {E[Q∗(eL)(S − C(eL))] + e∗G}. (II.5)
Under the social benefit compensation regime, (II.5) coincides with ex-
pected social welfare. Thus, the landowner has efficient incentives to
invest. Let us consider any other compensation regime and assume that
there exists some eL < e∗L such that E[UL(eL)] ≥ E[UL(e∗L)]. Because
expected social surplus is uniquely maximized by e∗L and e
∗
G, this can
only be the case if
−E[Q∗(eL)(S − C(eL))] > −E[Q∗(e∗L)(S − C(e∗L))].
Let us subtract E[Q∗(e∗L)C(eL)] from both sides of the inequality. This
term represents the hypothetical expected value of compensation if the
landowner invests eL, but the government bases its taking decision on
e∗L. After reorganizing, we get
−E[(q∗(eL)− q∗(e∗L))(S − C(eL))]] > E[Q∗(e∗L)C(e∗L)]− E[Q∗(e∗L)C(eL)].
(II.6)
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The right-hand side of (II.6) is greater or equal than zero because the
expected amount of compensation is non-decreasing in eL. In equation
(II.6), we consider the expected value of the social benefit of the taking
minus compensation in all states of the world where a taking occurs if the
decision is based on eL, but not if it is based on e∗L. The left-hand side
of (II.6) is negative because in any state it must hold that compensation
does not exceed the social benefit of the taking. If compensation is
equivalent to the social benefit of the taking in all states, the regime must
coincide with the social benefit compensation regime. Thus, under any
other regime, (II.6) is violated and therefore ∀eL ∈ eBRL (e∗G), eL ≥ e∗L.11
The intuition behind Proposition II.5 is straightforward. The landowner
has an incentive to overinvest for two reasons. First, in contrast to the
objective of a benevolent social planner, the landowner’s investment may
increase her expected amount of compensation whereas it does not affect
the value of the public good. Second, if a taking occurs, the landowner
receives an amount of compensation that is generally less than the so-
cial benefit of the taking. She thus has an incentive to overinvest to
reduce the probability that the government takes her property. Under
the social benefit compensation regime both sources of inefficiency do
not exist. Consequently, the landowner has efficient incentives to invest.
All regimes examined in the previous section are included in the class
of compensation regimes considered in Proposition II.5. It is worth
mentioning that Proposition II.5 contradicts the viewpoint expressed
in Miceli and Segerson (2007b) that, under a benevolent government, a
regime that grants the full value of the landowner’s land at its efficient
level of investment induces the first best.12 Recall that this regime, called
social optimal property value compensation regime in the previous sec-
11For any regime other than the social benefit compensation regime it is always possible to
construct an example where eBRL (e
∗
G) > e
∗
L. In such an example, it must hold that
E[(q∗(eL)− q∗(e∗L))C(eL)] << E[(q∗(eL)− q∗(e∗L))S].
12See Appendix 2.3 for a numerical example.
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tion, does induce the first best if the government is non-benevolent. The
classical Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984) no compensation result
is also connected to Proposition II.5: If the probability of a taking is
independent of investment, any lump sum compensation plan induces
the first best. In that case, in equation (II.5) the term in the braces
does not depend on the landowner’s investment. Hence, her investment
incentives coincide with those of a benevolent social planner.
5. Conclusion
This chapter considers a situation where both the government and the
landowner invest before the government may use its power of eminent
domain. This literature has begun blooming with the seminal work by
Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984).
The analysis suggests that if the ex ante probability of a taking is
low, a regime that grants due compensation performs reasonably well.
The government has efficient ex ante and ex post incentives, even if
it is non-benevolent and thus disregards the interests of the landowner.
The landowner’s overinvestment may be considered trivial relative to the
social optimum in such a situation. There also exist, however, situations
where the ex ante probability of a taking is substantial. As an example,
consider a situation where a supermarket owner knows that her property
will be taken because the government plans to construct a bypass road
where the supermarket is located. The owner, knowing that she is fully
insured, has a substantial incentive to invest money in her market.
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that social welfare may be
higher under the non-benevolent government. If the government is benev-
olent, only the social benefit compensation regime is generally able to
induce the first best. If, however, the government is wealth-constrained,
i.e., can only raise capital up to a certain amount that lies below the so-
cial benefit of the taking, the social benefit compensation regime is not
available. Thus, there may not exist any compensation regime to induce
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the first best. If the government is non-benevolent, optimal compen-
sation is equivalent to the hypothetical value of the landowner’s prop-
erty had she invested efficiently. This amount of compensation is, given
that a taking occurs, generally less than the social benefit of the taking.
Since, in practice, compensation is financed by taxes that are distort-
ing, the social benefit compensation regime generates excess burdens to
society. Consequently, society may be better off if the government is
non-benevolent.
According to U.S. law, one of the main motives behind compensation is
that compensation should be just. If the government is non-benevolent,
the optimal compensation regime grants to the landowner, in equilib-
rium, exactly the value of her property. In other words, she is perfectly
insured against the government’s power of eminent domain. Under the
social benefit compensation regime, which is the only regime to be gen-
erally optimal if the government is benevolent, the landowner receives
the value of the public good. Obviously, this amount may exceed the
private value of the landowner’s property by far.
It is also important to emphasize that one should distinguish between
two forms of public actions. First, law constitutes a set of rules that both
the government and the landowner have to follow. Of course, one of the
main goals of law should be to maximize social welfare. In contrast, the
government’s objectives may, as explained, not coincide with those of a
benevolent social planner.
For future research, it seems to be an interesting prospect to consider
a setting where the government is non-benevolent but subject to judi-
cial control with respect to the necessity of the taking. Ex post, the
government may only initiate a taking whenever it is socially desirable.
Ex ante, however, the government invests to maximize the difference be-
tween the social benefit of the taking and the amount of compensation
it has to pay.
III. Breakdown in
Multilateral Negotiations
We analyze a complete information multilateral bar-
gaining model in which a buyer is to purchase several
complementary goods from several sellers. Binding
cash-offer contracts are used to govern transactions.
In contrast to the preexisting literature, we do not nor-
malize the parties’ reservation utilities to zero. This
allows us to demonstrate that in a large class of bar-
gaining games a complete breakdown of negotiations
can occur as the unique equilibrium outcome even if
only two sellers are present.
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1. Introduction
Why do we observe union strikes? Why do negotiations about contiguous
parcels of land owned by several parties often break down? Why has
the government the right of eminent domain? Why is there a need for
a mandatory bankruptcy procedure? These and similar questions boil
down to the issue why rational parties often are not able to achieve the
full gains of trade.
In the present chapter, we consider a bargaining situation where sev-
eral sellers own exactly one piece of property. A central party needs to
acquire all pieces of property to start a profitable project. Thus, from
its perspective the pieces are complements. In the famous example of
Coase (1960), a railroad company may only be able to extent its net-
work if it manages to acquire the land of several landowners. Other
examples include an entrepreneur who negotiates with several unions or
an insolvency trustee that is in negotiations with different creditors. In
the present chapter, we consider as our leading example an airport that
wants to construct a new runway and needs to acquire land from several
farmers. As often done in the previous literature on extensive form bar-
gaining games, see e.g. Cai (2000) and Menezes and Pitchford (2004),
we limit the contract space to “binding cash-offer contracts”. Once an
agreement has been reached, the airport pays the farmer and the farmer
leaves the game. Thus, we do not consider contingent contracts where
the airport only has to pay the agreed upon price if it reaches an agree-
ment with all farmers. Binding cash-offer contracts are simple and easy
to enforce and therefore often used in land procurement, see e.g. Cai
(2000, p. 261).
In contrast to the previous literature, see e.g. Cai (2000), we do not
normalize the farmers’ reservation utilities to zero. This normalization
is an innocent assumption if for any parcel the airport and the farmers
have the same stand-alone valuation. However, the airport may not
be able to run a farm and may not be able to sell it without a loss
Essays in the Economic Analysis of Corporate and Public Law 67
should it have failed to acquire the land from all farmers.1 As we will
see, it is this assumption that crucially drives our main result that a
breakdown of negotiations may be the unique equilibrium outcome even
if only two farmers are in the game. Compared to Cai (2000), this is a
strong result. In his article, a breakdown can only occur if at least four
farmers are present and even if it does it exists only as one of multiple
equilibria. Intuitively, a breakdown may occur because when the airport
negotiates with the last farmer all previous payments to the other farmers
are sunk. Thus, these payments do not influence the outcome of the
negotiations. Consequently, it may be the case that the sum of the last
farmer’s negotiation surplus and the previous payments is higher than
the value of the airport’s project. Anticipating this problem, the airport
has an incentive not to reach an agreement with the previous farmers.
In the present chapter, we also depart from the previous literature in the
way we establish our breakdown result. We do not only consider a few
selected bargaining games, but instead prove that breakdown equilibria
exist in a large class of games. To do so, we identify a few sub-histories
and argue that if an agreement is reached at least one of them must occur
on the equilibrium path. Ruling out that any of them may occur then
directly allows us to conclude that a breakdown of negotiations must
be the unique equilibrium outcome. Moreover, we also explain that a
breakdown equilibrium is more likely to exist if the farmers are patient
compared to the airport and if the total bargaining cake, that consists
of the profit of the runway minus the farmers’ stand-alone valuations, is
small. Finally, we extend our model to N farmers. We demonstrate in a
particular bargaining game that if the number of farmers is sufficiently
large, a breakdown constitutes the unique equilibrium outcome even if
the total bargaining cake is very large.
Whereas the cooperative bargaining approach that goes back to Nash Jr
1Likewise, an agreement between an insolvency trustee and a single creditor or an entrepreneur and
a single union may be inefficient because of negotiation costs or because of spillover effects from
with other parties benefit.
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(1950) can naturally not explain a complete breakdown of negotiations,
there have been numerous other attempts to demonstrate bargaining in-
efficiencies in non-cooperative frameworks. Bargaining inefficiencies are
straightforward in models of asymmetric information.2 The rejection of
an offer can be a signal to be of a particular type. Therefore, it may
be optimal to reject an offer, hoping that the next offer is better. In
settings of full information, however, attempts to explain bargaining in-
efficiencies have been less successful. This is surprising as this strand of
the literature has begun blooming as early as with the seminal work by
Rubinstein (1982). In the preexisting literature a costly delay or a total
breakdown of negotiations may only exist as one of multiple equilibria.
Examples include van Damme, Selten, andWinter (1990), Fernandez and
Glazer (1991), Haller and Holden (1990), and Busch and Wen (1995).
In their models, delay can occur because parties “agree to delay”. More-
over, delay can only occur in non-stationary equilibria. Cai (2000), Cai
(2003) shows that delay may also occur in Markov perfect equilibria:
The more sellers are involved, the more serious is the delay until even a
total breakdown of negotiations is possible.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next
subsection, we demonstrate in a concrete example that a breakdown
of negotiations may occur even if only two farmers are present. After
outlining the model in section 2, we analyze the two-seller case in section
3. In section 4, we extend the model to N farmers. Section 5 concludes.
1.1. An Example
In this section, we provide a simple example to demonstrate that a break-
down of negotiations may occur as the unique equilibrium outcome even
if only two farmers are present. The two farmers each own one parcel of
land worth V1 = V2 = 0.4 to them. A local airport wants to construct
2Among others, see Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985), Hart (1989) and Rubinstein (1985) for
one-sided asymmetric information; Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987) and Fudenberg and Tirole
(1983) for two-sided asymmetric information.
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a new runway for which it needs to acquire both parcels. If the airport
manages to do so, the new runway yields a profit of S = 1. Should
the airport acquire just one piece of land, it has to pay the farmer, but
cannot construct the runway. In that case, the airport’s payoff is zero
minus the amount paid to the first farmer.3 Thus, from the perspective
of the airport the parcels are perfect complements. All parties have a
common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
For the purpose of this example, we adopt the bargaining procedure
used in Cai (2000): A fixed ordering of the farmers is given. At the
beginning of the game, the airport makes an offer to farmer 1. If he
does not accept the offer, he makes a counteroffer which the airport may
accept or reject. If there is no agreement, the next period begins and
the airport bargains with farmer 2 in a similar fashion. If there is no
agreement with farmer 2, a new period begins and the airport bargains
with farmer 1 and so on. Once the airport has reached an agreement with
one of the farmers, it and the remaining farmer bargain in an alternating
offer fashion with the airport making the first offer. The payoffs are
discounted once after each period.
Suppose the airport has agreed with farmer 1. Then, the airport and
farmer 2 bargain over a pie of size S − V2 = 0.6. Note that this pie is
larger than the overall (net) social surplus of the project S−V1−V2 = 0.2.
This is so because the amount paid to farmer 1 is sunk. From Rubinstein
(1982) we know that this subgame has a unique subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE). In this SPNE, the airport gets an ex-post surplus
(given that the price paid for the first parcel is sunk) of S−V21+δ . The
airport’s willingness to pay for farmer 1’s parcel is equal to the discounted
ex-post surplus 0.6δ1+δ . This amount is less than 0.4 for any δ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus,
the airport’s willingness to pay for the first parcel is less than farmer
1’s reservation value V1. Therefore, a breakdown must constitute the
unique equilibrium outcome. The equilibrium strategies are, however,
3In the model we relax the assumption that the airport’s valuation of a parcel is zero should it acquire
only one of the parcels.
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not unique: The airport may offer a farmer any amount strictly below
0.4 which the farmer then rejects. The farmers may propose any amount
greater than the airport’s willingness to pay, which is in turn rejected by
the airport.
The crucial driving factors behind our breakdown result are that the
airport’s stand-alone valuation for the parcels is lower than the farmers’
and that the last remaining farmer gets a significant share of the bar-
gaining cake. As we will see in the next sections, the exact structure of
the bargaining game does, in contrast, not drive our result.
2. The Model
We consider a model with N + 1 risk-neutral parties, one buyer and
N sellers. As a leading example, the buyer is an airport that needs to
acquire the farmers’ (sellers’) land to construct a new runway. Each
farmer i owns exactly one piece of land, which he valuates Vi > 0. Let
us denote the sum of these valuations by V :=
￿N
i=1 Vi. The airport’s
valuation depends on whether it manages to acquire all parcels or not.
If it does, it constructs the runway which it valuates S > V . Thus,
the construction is socially desirable. If the airport does not manage
to acquire all parcels, it is not able to construct the runway. In that
case, each parcel i is worth V Ai ≥ 0 to the airport. One may think of
V Ai ≥ 0 as the market price of the parcel. Alternatively, it may represent
the airport’s profit if it uses the parcel for some other purpose. Let
us denote the sum of these valuations by V A :=
￿N
i=1 V
A
i and assume
that Vi > V Ai ∀ i = 1, ..., N . Thus, for any given parcel the farmer’s
stand-alone valuation is greater than the airport’s. The parties’ discount
factors are denoted ∆ = {δA, δ1, ...δN} ∈ [0, 1]N+1, where δA represents
the airport’s discount factor. We assume that the parcels yield a constant
flow of same period utilities, i.e., (1− δi)Vi and (1− δA)V Ai for farmer i
and the airport, respectively. Throughout the chapter, we assume that
everything is common knowledge.
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In the previous literature, see e.g. Cai (2000), the farmers’ and the
airport’s stand-alone valuations Vi, V Ai are normalized to zero. As we
will see, that we do not adopt this normalization, but assume that the
farmers’ stand-alone valuations exceed the airport’s is the main driving
factor behind our breakdown result. Because we do not want to establish
our result in a specific game only, we are going to show that it holds in
a large class of discrete-time bargaining games. To do so, let us be more
precise about the class of games we consider:
General Bargaining Game.— A general bargaining game, in our sense,
consists of finitely or infinitely many periods. Each period consists of
finitely or infinitely many rounds. The parties discount after each but
not within a period. In any given round, some or all of the players may
perform exactly one action. Depending on the game under consideration,
the following actions may or may not be possible in any given round:
The airport may make binding cash-offers to one or to several farmers
simultaneously. Or one of the farmers may offer to sell his land to the
airport. We also allow bargaining games where the party that can make
offers in a given round is determined randomly. If a party gets an offer,
it must decide in the round thereafter to either accept or reject it. If this
party agrees, the airport immediately receives the farmer’s parcel but
has to pay the agreed upon price Bi to the farmer, who then leaves the
game. We do not consider contingent contracts. Thus, the airport may
not offer farmer i some price it only has to pay if it reaches an agreement
with the remaining farmers. If at the beginning of some round only two
parties, the airport and one farmer, are left in the game, we assume the
following:
Assumption 1 If at the beginning of any given round only the
airport and exactly one farmer are left in the game, the airport and
the farmer play Rubinstein’s (1982) simple alternating offers game
with the airport making the first offer. Any unanswered offer is
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void and the game continues until the Rubinstein game is finished.
Assumption 1 ensures that the last remaining farmer gets some positive
fraction of the total bargaining cake. Thus, we implicitly rule out that
the airport can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to this farmer. Assump-
tion 1 also states that offers may be void and thus remain unanswered.
That occurs if only two parties are left in the game and one of them still
has an offer on the table. Then, these parties play the Rubinstein game.
It is important to emphasize that neither this assumption nor the fact
that the airport makes the first offer in the Rubinstein game drives our
main result. In the next section, we explain the parties’ payoffs in detail.
As an illustration, let us consider some examples that are in the class of
games we consider:
(1) The fixed bargaining procedure: At the beginning of the game, a
fixed ordering of farmers is given. Starting from the first farmer, the
airport negotiates with the farmers in an alternating offer fashion as in
Rubinstein (1982). The airport moves only to the next farmer if it has
reached an agreement with the previous farmer.
This procedure can also be seen as a sequence of alternating offer
games. It is an infinite horizon bargaining game in which each period
consists of exactly two rounds. In the first round, an offer is made and
in the second round it is either accepted or rejected.
(2) The circular bargaining procedure: This is the procedure used in
Cai (2000). It is related to the fixed bargaining procedure. However, the
sequence of agreements is determined endogenously. The farmers are
ordered in a circle. Starting from the first farmer, the airport bargains
with one farmer over a price in an alternating offer fashion. Each period
starts with an offer by the airport, which the farmer then accepts or
rejects. If he rejects, he makes a counteroffer in the next period which
in turn the airport accepts or rejects. Once an agreement is reached, the
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airport pays the agreed price right away and the farmer leaves the circle
permanently. If the airport rejects the farmer’s counteroffer, it then
bargains with the next farmer in a similar fashion. After negotiating
with the last farmer, the airport bargains with all farmers still in the
game in the same order as before.
Cai’s (2000) definition of a round differs from ours. What he denotes
as a round is the span of time the airport negotiates with one farmer
before it moves to the next. In the language of the present chapter,
each period of the circular bargaining procedure consists of exactly two
rounds. That is so because the parties do not discount after an offer has
been made but only after it has been accepted or rejected.
(3) “Weird” bargaining procedure: If at any point in time only the
airport and one farmer are left in the game, they play the Rubinstein
game. The game begins with the airport making simultaneous offers
to all farmers which they may accept or reject. Then, unless all or all
but one farmer accepted the airport’s offer, in the second period one
randomly determined farmer makes an offer to the airport which it may
either accept or reject. In the third period, no player has an action. In
the fourth period, the airport makes simultaneous offers to all remaining
farmers which they accept or reject. If more than one farmer rejects, the
game ends. If one farmer rejects, the remaining farmer and the airport
play the Rubinstein game starting from the fifth period.
Of course, this bargaining procedure is constructed arbitrarily. We
provide it to illustrate that we do indeed consider a large class of bar-
gaining games. As mentioned, to establish our main result it will turn
out to be crucial that the last farmer still in the game can ensure himself
some positive share of the ex-post bargaining surplus. To ensure that
he can do so, we assumed that he and the airport play the Rubinstein
game. Note that the Rubinstein game always takes precedence. To il-
lustrate this point, consider a simple one period game where the airport
makes simultaneous offers to all farmers which they accept or reject.
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This game lasts only one period unless exactly one farmer rejects. In
that case this farmer and the airport play the Rubinstein game and the
total bargaining game is played at least two periods.
3. The two-Seller Case
In this section, we demonstrate that even if only two farmers are present
a breakdown of negotiations may be the unique equilibrium outcome.
Recall that if at the beginning of some round only two parties, one
farmer and the airport, are left in the game, they play the Rubinstein
game. Let us denote the farmers’ Rubinstein payoffs by
R1 :=
￿
δ1(1− δA)(S − V1 − V A2 )
1− δAδ1 + V1
￿
and
R2 :=
￿
δ2(1− δA)(S − V2 − V A1 )
1− δAδ2 + V2
￿
(III.1)
, respectively. The first line of (III.1) represents farmer 1’s Rubinstein
payoff in a situation where he is the last farmer in the game. Recall
that the outside option for the airport is V A2 , i.e. to only use farmer 2’s
parcel which it acquired earlier. Likewise, farmer 1’s outside option is
V1, i.e. to keep using his parcel. Thus (S−V1−V A2 ) represents the total
bargaining cake between the airport and farmer 1. Note also that any
previous payment from the airport to farmer 2 is sunk and thus does
not influence the outcome of the Rubinstein game. Without knowing
how the bargaining game exactly looks like, we can still deduce that an
agreement between the airport and the farmers can only be an equilib-
rium outcome if
(i) the airport and one farmer, say farmer 2, play the Rubinstein game
and reach an agreement. Within the same period, but in some previous
round, the airport reached an agreement with farmer 1. This agreement
may have been reached because the airport accepted an offer from farmer
1 or because farmer 1 accepted an offer from the airport. Or
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(ii) the airport and one farmer, say farmer 2, play the Rubinstein game
and reach an agreement. In some previous period, the airport reached
an agreement with farmer 1. This agreement may have been reached
because the airport accepted an offer from farmer 1 or farmer 1 accepted
an offer from the airport. Or
(iii) the airport makes simultaneous offers to farmer 1 and farmer 2
which they accept. Each farmer knows that had he not accepted, the
next round would have been in the same period or
(iv) the airport makes simultaneous offers to farmer 1 and farmer 2
which they accept. Each farmer knows that had he not accepted, the
next round would have been in a new period.
Recall that the parties do not discount between two rounds if these
rounds are in the same period. Thus cases (i) and (ii), and (iii) and
(iv) differ only in that the parties discount in cases (ii) and (iv) but not
in (i) and (iii). If there exists an agreement equilibrium in any game
that is in the class of games we consider, one of the four sub-histories
described above must occur on the equilibrium path. To establish our
breakdown result, it is therefore sufficient to prove that there exist pa-
rameters (S, V1, V2) such that none of these sub-histories may occur on
the equilibrium path. Of course, a breakdown result is only of interest if
the construction of the runway is socially desirable. Thus, recall that we
assumed S > V1 + V2 > V A1 + V
A
2 . We prove the following proposition:
Proposition III.1: For any discount factors δA ∈ (0, 1) and (δ1, δ2)
∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1) and for any valuations (V1, V2) ∈ (0,∞) × (0,∞) and
(V A1 , V
A
2 ) ∈ [0, V1) × [0, V2) there exists a project value S > V1 + V2
such that a breakdown of negotiations constitutes the unique equilibrium
outcome in any general bargaining game.
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Proof.
The proof is structured as follows. First, we derive in each of the four
cases a necessary condition for trade to be desirable for all parties. If
it does not hold, at least one of the parties has an incentive to deviate
and thus this case or sub-history cannot occur on the equilibrium path.
Second, we show that there exist parameter constellations under which
trade is socially desirable but none of the conditions holds. Thus, a
breakdown must be the unique equilibrium outcome.
(i) If there exists an agreement equilibrium, the airport and farmer 2
reach a Rubinstein agreement. Thus, the airport pays R2 to farmer 2.
In some previous round but in the same period, the airport has to pay
at least V1 to farmer 1. Of course, the airport anticipates that should it
reach an agreement with farmer 1, it has to pay R2 to farmer 2. Thus
an agreement can only be profitable for the airport if
V1 +R2 ≤ S.4 (Condition 1)
(ii) This case is similar to case (i). The only difference is that the Ru-
binstein game between the airport and farmer 2 begins in a new period.
Thus, the amount the airport has to pay to farmer 1 is relatively more
important and an agreement can only be profitable for the airport if
V1 + δAR2 ≤ δAS + (1− δA)V A1 (III.2)
where (1 − δA)V A1 represents that the airport can use farmer 1’s parcel
for one more period. Let us rewrite (III.2) as
V1 − (1− δA)V A1
δA
+R2 ≤ S. (Condition 2)
Note that if Condition 1 does not hold, it directly follows that Condition
2 does not hold either.
4Condition 1 is not a sufficient but a necessary condition for an agreement to be profitable for the
airport. Depending on the game, the airport may have to pay farmer 1 more than V1 for his parcel.
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(iii) In this case the airport makes a simultaneous offer to both farmers
which they accept. Should one of the farmers reject the airport’s offer, he
can ensure himself the Rubinstein outcome which he receives in the next
round. Thus, to prevent that the farmers have an incentive to deviate,
the airport has to offer them at least their potential Rubinstein payoffs
R1 and R2. An agreement can therefore only be profitable for the airport
if
R1 +R2 ≤ S. (Condition 3)
(iv) This case is similar to case (iii). The only difference is that should
a farmer reject the airport’s offer, the Rubinstein game begins not in the
same, but in the next period. Thus, in any agreement equilibrium, the
airport has to pay at least
(1− δ1)V1 + δ1R1 + (1− δ2)V2 + δ2R2
where (1 − δ1)V1 and (1 − δ2)V2 represent that should a farmer refuse
the airport’s offer he can use his land for one more period. Trade is only
profitable for the airport if
(1− δ1)V1 + δ1R1 + (1− δ2)V2 + δ2R2 ≤ S. (Condition 4)
Note that if Condition 4 does not hold, Condition 3 does not either. In
principle, the farmers could also use mixed strategies when the airport
makes a simultaneous offer. In the appendix we demonstrate that if none
of the four conditions holds a breakdown of negotiations must be the
unique equilibrium outcome even if the parties can use mixed strategies.
Let us now show that there exist parameter constellations under which
trade is socially desirable but none of the conditions holds. This is the
case if
min[V1 +R2, V2 +R1, (1− δ1)V1 + δ1R1 + (1− δ2)V2 + δ2R2] > S.
(III.3)
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It is clear that if (III.3) holds, trade cannot take place sequentially and
simultaneously. Of course, a breakdown result is not surprising if trade
is socially not desirable. However, for any discount factors δA ∈ (0, 1)
and (δ1, δ2) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1), there exists some S > V1+V2 that is smaller
than the left hand side of (III.3). To see that this is so, note that (δ1, δ2)
∈ (0, 1]× (0, 1] implies R1 > V1 and R2 > V2.
Intuitively, two important factors drive our result. First, that we did
not normalize, as e.g. in Cai (2000), the farmers’ stand-alone utility
to zero and second that the parcels are complements in the sense that
the full benefit only accrues to the airport if it acquires both parcels.
Consider a situation where the airport acquired the parcel from farmer 1
and is bargaining with farmer 2. The price paid to farmer 1 is sunk and
therefore does not affect the outcome of the Rubinstein game between
the airport and farmer 2. Hence, there exist situations where the sum
of the price paid to farmer 1 plus farmer 2’s Rubinstein share is higher
than the value of the airport’s project S. Anticipating this and knowing
that farmer 1 does not accept any price below his reservation utility V1,
the airport may not be willing to reach an agreement with farmer 1. A
breakdown equilibrium may also exist in games where the airport makes
simultaneous offers to both farmers. To ensure that neither farmer has
an incentive to reject the airport’s offer, the airport has to offer them at
least their Rubinstein payoffs. This is so because given that, say, farmer
1 accepts the airport’s offer, farmer 2 is in a strong position. He knows
that should he reject the airport’s offer, he will play a Rubinstein game
with the airport. It is clear that a breakdown may occur because the
airport may not be able to pay both farmers their respective Rubinstein
payoffs.
Surprisingly, a breakdown may also occur if the airport is patient, i.e.,
its discount factor is high and the farmers’ are low. From the proof, we
can deduce that this can only be the case if the value of the airport’s
project S is close to the sum of the reservation utilities of the farmers,
V1+V2. Thus, a breakdown equilibrium is more likely to exist if the gap
Essays in the Economic Analysis of Corporate and Public Law 79
between S and V1 + V2 is small and if the farmers are patient relative
to the airport. The latter statement stems from the fact that a patient
farmer can ensure himself a larger Rubinstein payoff. Recall that the
class of bargaining games contains games where, as long as both farmers
are still in the game, the parties discount but also games where they do
not discount. From the proof we can deduce that in the sequential case
a breakdown equilibrium is more likely to exist if the parties play a game
where they do discount. This is so because the amount the airport pays
to the first farmer is relatively more important compared to the value
of the project, S, that accrues to it one period later. In contrast, in
the simultaneous case a breakdown is less likely if the parties discount.
Recall that the airport has to offer each farmer at least his respective
Rubinstein surplus. This amount is lower if a new period begins after
the airport’s offer compared to situations where if the Rubinstein game
occurs it does so in the same period.
In the next section, we extend our model to the N -farmer case. We
demonstrate that if sufficiently many farmers are present, a breakdown
may constitute the unique equilibrium outcome even if the airport is
patient relative to the farmers and if the value of the airport’s project is
very high compared to the sum of the farmers’ reservation utilities.
4. The N-Farmer Case
Let us explore how our model can be extended to the N -farmer case. It is
straightforward that our breakdown result can also be established if more
than two farmers are present. As before, at least one of the farmers gets
more than his reservation utility. Hence, a breakdown of negotiations is
the unique equilibrium outcome for a sufficiently low value of S. Recall
also that it is a well-known result of the literature, see e.g. Cai (2000),
that a breakdown equilibrium is more likely to exist if more farmers are
present.5 In this section, we use the fixed bargaining procedure as a
5In Cai (2000), a breakdown of negotiations can only occur if at least four farmers are present.
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concrete example. As we will see, a breakdown constitutes the unique
equilibrium outcome even if the airport is patient relative to the farmers
and if the value of the airport’s project is high compared to the sum of
the farmers’ reservation utilities.
Recall that under the fixed bargaining procedure a fixed ordering of
farmers is given. Starting from the first farmer, the airport negotiates
with the farmers in an alternating offer fashion as in Rubinstein (1982).
The airport moves only to the next farmer if it has reached an agreement
with the previous farmer. To be able to do comparative statics with
respect to the number of farmers, we assume that they are symmetric:
The farmers share a common discount factor δF ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore,
all parcels are worth VN to the farmers and
V A
N to the airport. Note
that we keep the sums of these stand-alone valuations constant: If more
farmers are present, the value of each farmer’s parcel decreases. Let
us derive the solution by backwards induction: Given that the airport
has reached an agreement with all farmers but the last (farmer N), the
airport and farmer N bargain over a pie of size
Joint surplus in case of trade￿￿￿￿
S −
￿
(N − 1)V A
N
+
V
N
￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿
Joint surplus in case of no trade
> 0.
Note that at this point all payments to the previous farmers (farmers
1, ..., N−1) are sunk and thus do not affect the outcome of the Rubinstein
game between the airport and farmer N . The airport’s payoff from the
negotiations with farmer N amounts to
(1− δF )
￿
S − V+(N−1)V AN
￿
1− δAδF +
(N − 1)V A
N
. (III.4)
The airport and farmer N − 1 anticipate that should they reach an
agreement, (III.4) is the airport’s ex-post payoff. They thus negotiate
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over a pie of size
Joint surplus in case of trade￿ ￿￿ ￿
δA
(1− δF )
￿
S − V+(N−1)V AN
￿
1− δAδF +
(N − 1)V A
N
+ (1− δA)V A(N − 1)
N
−
￿
(N − 2)V A
N
+
V
N
￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿
Joint surplus in case of no trade
= δA
(1− δF )
￿
S − V+(N−1)V AN
￿
1− δAδF
− V − V A
N
. (III.5)
The term (1 − δA)V A(N−1)N captures the one period utility the airport
derives from all parcels it owns after an agreement with farmer N − 1.
Of course, (III.5) may, in principle, be negative. In that case, we can
directly conclude that a breakdown of negotiation must constitute the
unique equilibrium outcome. For trade to be an equilibrium outcome,
the bargaining pie between the first farmer and the airport must be non-
negative. If it is, it is straightforward that all following bargaining pies
between the airport and the other farmers are non-negative, too. In
the appendix we calculate the pie between the airport and farmer 1 and
prove that
Lemma 1:
S ≥ N − 1
N
V A +
N￿
i=1
V − V A
N
￿
1− δAδF
δA(1− δF )
￿N−i
(III.6)
is a necessary condition for trade to occur. That (III.6) holds with strict
inequality is sufficient for trade to occur.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 1 highlights a nice feature of the fixed bargaining procedure.
Only if it holds with equality, both a breakdown and trade constitute
an equilibrium outcome. Let us consider the impact of the number of
farmers on the likeliness of a breakdown of negotiations. Recall that we
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keep the sum of the farmers’ and the airport’s stand-alone valuations
constant as N grows.
If δA < 1, the term
1−δAδF
δA(1−δF ) is strictly greater than 1. Thus, the right-
hand side goes to infinity as the number of farmers goes to infinity. We
have established the following proposition:
Proposition III.2: If all farmers are symmetric, for N sufficiently large
a breakdown of negotiations constitutes the unique equilibrium outcome
for any parameter constellation.
The intuition behind Proposition III.2 is that each farmer receives a pos-
itive fraction of the residual bargaining cake. Because previous payments
are sunk and not taken into account, the sum of these fractions may ex-
ceed the total bargaining cake. This effect is magnified the more farmers
are present and thus a breakdown constitutes the unique equilibrium
outcome for a sufficiently large number of farmers. That a breakdown
may occur even for a very large social surplus S−V may help to explain
often observed real-world behavior. In land assembly problems, the so-
cial surplus is typically large, but the number of parties involved may be
also.
In this section, we have only considered a particular game. To analyze
the consequences of increasing the number of farmers in the entire class
of general bargaining games defined in the previous section is extremely
cumbersome if not unfeasible. It is apparent that a breakdown can never
become less likely if more farmers are involved. If, however, a breakdown
must occur even for a very large social surplus depends on the bargaining
protocol under consideration. We conjecture that this is more likely to
be the case in games where the parcels have to be obtained sequentially.
As mentioned, the airport then loses money with each agreement.
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5. Discussion
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that if the parties bargain
over complements and the transactions are governed by binding cash-
offer contracts, a breakdown of negotiations may often be the unique
equilibrium outcome. We claim that this is true for a very large class
of bargaining games. This class of games includes games where, as long
as at least two farmers are still in the game, the parties may discount
in certain periods and not discount in others. Yet, we assume that the
parties play a Rubinstein game once only one farmer is left. Does this
reduce the generality of our result? We claim that this is not so. For our
result to hold it is important only that the last farmer still in the game
can ensure himself more than his reservation utility. A counterexample
in which he cannot do so are take-it-or-leave-it games. In these games,
the airport has the full relative bargaining power and must offer both
farmers their respective reservation utilities only.
Our assumption that a Rubinstein game is played once only two parties
are left may lead to situations where an offer is still on the table. This
offer then remains unanswered. Suppose we would have assumed that
any offer has to be answered before the Rubinstein game is played. Then,
the party that has to respond to the offer knows that a rejection directly
leads to the Rubinstein game being played. Suppose a farmer is the
one to respond. This farmer would not accept less than what he would
get in the Rubinstein game. If the airport is the one to respond, the
farmer anticipates that should the airport decline his offer the parties
play the Rubinstein game. Consequently, the farmer demands at least
his Rubinstein payoff. Thus our implicit assumption that offers may
remain unanswered simplifies the analysis but does not drive our main
result.
As a possible extension, we could also have allowed that the farmers
may purchase land from each other. We believe that our breakdown
result can also be established in such situations. In contrast to before, it
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is then the last remaining farmer whose earlier payments are sunk at the
point in time he and the airport play the Rubinstein game. Thus, if the
sum of these sunk payments is larger than the last remaining farmer’s
Rubinstein share, he makes a loss. Anticipating this, none of the farmers
may have an incentive to buy the other farmers’ parcels.
In the present chapter we have only explicitly considered binding cash-
offer contracts. We believe, however, that our breakdown result can be
generalized to more complex contractual settings. Consider, for example,
the parties stipulated in contract that the airport has the right to sell
back a parcel for some price that is below the farmer’s stand-alone utility.
This price can then be interpreted as the airport’s stand-alone valuation
of the parcel. Thus with the introduction of V Ai we have covered many
possibilities of what may happen if the airport acquires not all of the
parcels: The airport may use the parcel, sell it on the market, or sell it
to one of the farmers. For future research it is an interesting prospect
to analyze whether our result holds if the parties can write even more
complex contracts. A promising case to study may be option contracts
where a parcel is only acquired and the farmer paid if the airport reaches
an agreement with all farmers.
A. Appendices
1. Appendix to Chapter I
1.1. Threshold under Uninformed Creditor’s Priority and
dU > YL
We know that for the equilibrium threshold q∗L = q
∗
L(αU |dU > YL), the
following equation holds, where - in slight abuse of notation - r∗U(αU , qL|dU >
YL) is the value of rU that yields to zero profit for U given a threshold
qL:
YH = r
∗
I(αU , q
∗
L, r
∗
U , z
∗
U) + r
∗
U(αU , q
∗
L|dU > YL)
=
dI
q∗L
+
2dU − (1− q∗L)YL
1 + q∗L
⇔(1 + q∗L)q∗LYH = (1 + q∗L)dI + 2q∗L
￿
dU − 1
2
(1− q∗L)YL
￿
⇔(q∗L + q∗L2)YH = (1 + q∗L)dI + 2q∗LdU − (q∗L − q∗L2)YL
⇔0 = q∗L2(YL − YH)− q∗L[YH + YL − 2dU − dI ] + dI = 0
⇔0 = q∗L2 + q∗L
YH + YL − dU −D
YH − YL −
dI
YH − YL
⇔q∗L = −
YH + YL − dU −D
2(YH − YL) ±
￿￿
YH + YL − dU −D
2(YH − YL)
￿2
+
dI
YH − YL .
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Note that we can exclude the −solution because then the solution for q∗L
would be negative.
q∗L = −
YH + YL − dU −D
2(YH − YL) +
￿￿
YH + YL − dU −D
2(YH − YL)
￿2
+
4(YH − YL)dI
[2(YH − YL)]2
⇔q∗L = −
YH + YL − dU −D
2(YH − YL) +
￿
[YH + YL − dU −D]2 + 4dI(YH − YL)
2(YH − YL)
(I.11)
1.2. Threshold under the Pro-rata Rule
Recall that under the pro-rata rule the threshold q∗L = qL(αP ) up to
which the informed creditor can finance the projects is a max-function
with one argument being qSO. Now, suppose the equilibrium threshold
was indeed q∗L = q
SO. In this case, we had:1
r∗I(αP , qL, r
∗
U , z
∗
U) + r
∗
U(αP , q
∗
L)
=
dI − (1− qSO)dIYL
qSO
+
2dU − (1− qSO)dUYL
1 + qSO
<
dI − (1− qSO)dIYL
qSO
+
dU − (1− qSO)dUYL
qSO
= YH ,
1Recall that r∗I (αP , qL, r
∗
U , z
∗
U ) is the value of rI that yields zero profit for the informed creditor for
qL and r∗U (αP , q
∗
L) is the value of rU that leads to zero profit for the uninformed creditor given
that all projects q ≥ qL are carried out.
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which means that this restriction cannot be binding. Hence, the other
restriction must be binding, which yields:
YH = r
∗
I(αP , q
∗
L, r
∗
U , z
∗
U) + r
∗
U(αP , q
∗
L) (A.1)
=
dI − (1− q∗L)YLdI
q∗L
+
2dU − (1− q∗L)dUYL
1 + q∗L
⇔q∗L(1 + q∗L)YH = (1 + q∗L)[dI − (1− q∗L)YLdI ] + q∗L[2dU − (1− q∗L)dUYL]
⇔q∗L2(YH − YL) + q∗L(YH − dI − 2dU + dUYL) + (YLdI − dI) = 0
⇔q∗L = −
YH − 2dU + YLdU − dI
2(YH − YL)
±
￿￿
YH − 2dU + YLdU − dI
2(YH − YL)
￿2
+
dI − dIYL
YH − YL
(A.2)
Note that we can exclude the −-solution, because dIYL − dI is smaller
than zero. Hence:
⇔q∗L(αP ) =
YH − 2dU + YLdU − dI
2(YH − YL)
±
￿￿
YH − 2dU + YLdU − dI
2(YH − YL)
￿2
+
dI − dIYL
YH − YL (I.16)
As D − YL > 0 holds, there must be a real solution. Therefore, the
absolute value of the root is smaller than the absolute value of the first
summand.
1.3. Proof of Proposition I.7
We have to show that under any rule, the threshold is weakly lower than
the socially efficient one. Under U ￿s priority and when even the low state
cash flow is sufficient to repay his loan, we have found the result to be
first best. Under informed creditor’s priority the threshold is either 0 or
dI−YL
YH−YL , which is strictly lower than the socially efficient threshold.
For the two remaining cases (uninformed creditor’s priority with dU >
YL and pro-rata rule), recall that r∗I(α, qL) = r
∗
I(α, qL, rU , zU), r
∗
U(α, qL)
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denote the values of rI , rU such that the creditors make zero profit in
expectation given a threshold qL. We know that r∗I(α, q
∗
L) + r
∗
U(α, q
∗
L) =
YH holds for the equilibrium threshold. Furthermore, we know that both
r∗I(α, qL) and r
∗
U(α, qL) are strictly monotonically decreasing in qL. We
can conclude that whenever the sum of the repayment claims exceeds
YH for a given qL, the threshold in equilibrium must be higher, and, in
turn, if the sum of the repayment claims falls short of YH , the threshold
must be lower.
Now, suppose, the socially efficient threshold was the equilibrium
threshold, qL = qSO:
Under uninformed creditor’s priority and dU > YL we have:
r∗I(αU , q
SO) + r∗U(αU , q
SO) =
dI
qSO
+
2dU −
￿
1− qSO￿YL
1 + qSO
=
dI
qSO
+
2dU − 2
￿
1− qSO￿YL
1 + qSO
+ YL <
dI
qSO
+
dU − YL + qSOYL
qSO
+ YL
<
dI
qSO
+
dU − YL
qSO
+ YL =
(D − YL)(YH − YL)
D − YL + YL = YH ,
and for the pro-rata rule:
r∗I(αP , q
SO) + r∗U(αP , q
SO) =
dI − (1− qSO)dIYL
qSO
+
2dU − (1− qSO)dUYL
1 + qSO
< dI
1− (1− qSO)YL
qSO
+ dU
1− (1− qSO)YL
qSO
=
1− (1− qSO)YL
qSO
=
(D − YL)(YH − YL)
D − YL + YL = YH
Hence, at the socially efficient threshold r∗I(α, q
SO) + r∗U(α, q
SO) < YH
holds for both rules. Hence, the threshold must be lower in equilibrium,
which proves the claim.
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1.4. Proof of Proposition I.8
First of all, from above we know that under U ￿s priority and dU ≤ YL,
the threshold must be highest. Under informed creditor’s priority and
dI ≤ YL, all projects may be realized, which implies that the threshold
is lowest.
If dI > YL, the cutoff value under informed creditor’s priority is given
by q∗L(αI |dI > YL) = dI−YLYH−YL . Now suppose, this was the cutoff value in
case of the pro-rata rule:2
r∗I(αP , q
∗
L(αI |dI > YL)) + r∗U(αP , q∗L(αI |dI > YL))
=
dI − (1− qL)YL
qL
+
dU
1+qL
2
=
(dI − YL)(YH − YL)
YH − YL + YL +
dU
1+qL
2
> YH ,
which implies that the threshold under the pro-rata rule is higher than
under informed creditor’s priority.
To compare the pro-rata rule with uninformed creditor’s priority with
dU > YL, recall the condition for the equilibrium threshold under the
pro-rata rule:
YH = r
∗
I(αP , q
∗
L(αP ), r
∗
U , z
∗
U) + r
∗
U(αP , q
∗
L(αP )) (A.1)
=
dI − (1− q∗L(αP ))YLdI
q∗L(αP )
+
2dU − (1− q∗L(αP ))dUYL
1 + q∗L(αP )
= dI
1− (1− q∗L(αP ))YL
q∗L(αP )
+ dU
1− (1− 1+q∗L(αP )2 )YL
1+q∗L(αP )
2
=
dI
q∗L(αP )
− dIYL
q∗L(αP )
+
dU
1+q∗L(αP )
2
− dUYL
1+q∗L(αP )
2
+ YL
≤ dI
q∗L(αP )
− dIYL
1+q∗L(αP )
2
+
dU
1+q∗L(αP )
2
− dUYL
1+q∗L(αP )
2
+ YL
=
dI
q∗L(αP )
− dI − (1−
1+q∗L(αP )
2 )YL
1+q∗L(αP )
2
= r∗I(αU , q
∗
L(αP ), r
∗
U , z
∗
U) + r
∗
U(αU , q
∗
L(αP )) (A.3)
2Recall that r∗I (α, qL) = r
∗
I (α, qL, rU , zU ), r
∗
U (α, qL) denote the values of rI , rU such that the creditors
make zero profit in expectation.
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Note that the inequality holds strictly whenever YL > 0. If YL = 0, the
thresholds are equal. Expression (A.3) is the hypothetical sum under
uninformed creditor’s priority for the threshold in the pro-rata case. We
can see that YH falls short of this sum whenever YL > 0, which indicates
that under uninformed creditor’s priority, the threshold must be higher.
If YL = 0 holds, however, the thresholds under uninformed creditor’s
priority with dU > YL and the pro-rata rule are equal.
1.5. Threshold under Equity Financing
We know that for the equilibrium threshold q∗L = q
∗
L(αE) both (I.24) and
(I.21) have to be fulfilled. Reorganizing of (I.23) yields:
1 + q∗L
2
x∗UYH +
1− q∗L
2
x∗UYL = dU
⇔ x∗U [q∗LYH + (1− q∗L)YL] = 2dU − x∗UYH .
Substituting for x∗U (see (I.20)) yields
q∗LYH + (1− q∗L)YL − dI = 2dU − YH
￿
1− dI
q∗LYH + (1− q∗L)YL
￿
⇔ YH − YH − dI
q∗LYH + (1− q∗L)YL
+ q∗LYH + (1− q∗L)YL = D + dU
Now, let us substitute q∗LYH + (1− q∗L)YL by E[Y |q∗L]:
YHE[Y |q∗L]− YHdI + E2[Y |q∗L] = E[Y |q∗L](D + dU)
⇔E[Y |q∗L] =
D + dU − YH
2
±
￿
1
4
(D + dU − YH)2 + YHdI .
Note that we can exclude the −solution because this would yield a neg-
ative value for E[Y |q∗L]. Re-substituting yields
q∗LYH + (1− q∗L)YL =
D + dU − YH
2
+
￿
1
4
(D + dU − YH)2 + YHdI
⇔q∗L(αE) =
1
2 (D + dU − YH) +
￿
1
4(D + dU − YH)2 + YHdI − YL
YH − YL
(I.25)
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1.6. Proof of Proposition I.10
In order to establish the proposition, we have to show that the thresh-
old in case of equity financing is higher than under informed creditor’s
priority, but lower than under the pro-rata rule.
The first part of the claim is quite easily shown. We know from above
that under equity financing q∗L(αE) > 0. Thus, we only need to consider
the case with dI > YL. If the threshold under equity financing were then
equal to dI−YLYH−YL , the sum of the shares would be:
3
x∗I
￿
αE, qL =
dI − YL
YH − YL , x
∗
U , z
∗
U
￿
+ x∗U
￿
αE, qL =
dI − YL
YH − YL
￿
=
dI
YH
dI−YL
YH−YL + YL(1− dI−YLYH−YL )
+
dU
YH
YH+dI−2YL
2(YH−YL) + YL
YH−dI
2(YH−YL)
>
dI(YH − YL)
YH(dI − YL) + YL(YH − dI) =
dI(YH − YL)
YHdI − YLdI = 1
As both x∗I and x
∗
U are strictly decreasing in qL, the equilibrium threshold
must be higher. Hence, under equity financing less projects may get
started than under informed creditor’s priority.
In the second step, let us compare the thresholds of the pro-rata rule
and equity financing. Here, we employ a slightly different method: We
calculate the expected payment to the uninformed creditor in case of the
pro-rata rule and show that this is more than what the entrepreneur pays
in expectation to the uninformed creditor. From this we can conclude
that the coalition of the informed creditor and the entrepreneur can
finance even worse projects under equity financing than under the pro-
rata rule.
The expected payment in case of the pro-rata rule is given by:
3Recall that x∗I(αE , qL, rU , zU ), x
∗
U (αE , qL) denote the values of rI , rU such that the creditors make
zero profit in expectation given a threshold qL.
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q∗L(αP )r
∗
U(αP ) + (1− q∗L(αP ))dUYL
= dU
￿
q∗L(αP )
2− (1− q∗L(αP ))YL
1 + q∗L(αP )
+ (1− q∗L(αP ))YL
￿
= dU
￿
2q∗L(αP ) + (1− q∗L(αP ))YL
1 + q∗L(αP )
￿
= dU
￿
2 + 2q∗L(αP ) + (1− q∗L(αP ))YL − 2
1 + q∗L(αP )
￿
= dU
￿
2− 2− 2YL − (1− q
∗
L(αP )− 2)YL
1 + q∗L(αP )
￿
= dU
￿
2− 2− 2YL
1 + q∗L(αP )
− YL
￿
≥ dU
￿
2− 2YH
(1 + q∗L(αP ))YH + (1− q∗L(αP ))YL
￿
= q∗L(αP )YH
2dU
(1 + q∗L(αP ))YH + (1− q∗L(αP )))YL
+ (1− q∗L(αP ))YL
2dU
(1 + q∗L(αP ))YH + (1− q∗L(αP )))YL
,
which is the hypothetical expected payment to the uninformed creditor
in case of equity financing if q∗L(αP ) was the threshold. This implies that
the equilibrium threshold under equity financing is lower than under
the pro-rata rule. Note that the expression in the braced part must be
greater than zero, because otherwise all projects in average would yield a
loss, which would imply that the uninformed creditor would never grant
a credit.
Essays in the Economic Analysis of Corporate and Public Law 93
2. Appendix to Chapter II
2.1. Comparison between private and efficient investment
Proof. Let us compare the landowner’s privately optimal investment
level in absence of the risk of a taking with the socially best response
to the government’s investment in the general case where a taking may
occur. We prove that epL is, for any investment of the government, at
least as high as any eL ∈ eSBRL (eG). In absence of the risk of a taking,
the landowner’s optimal investment maximizes
epL ∈ argmax
e∈[0,emaxL ]
E[UpL(eL,ω, q)] = E[V (eL,ω)]− eL.
Take any eG ∈ [0, emaxG ] and note that
E[UpL(eL,ω, q)]− E[W (eL, eG,ω, q∗(eL, eG,ω))] =
E[min[V (eL,ω)− S(eG,ω), 0] + eG
is increasing in eL due to Assumption 2. Let us denote the greatest
element of eSBRL (eG) by e
max
L (eG). Take any eL < e
max
L (eG) that is not a
socially best response itself. Then it must hold that
E[UpL(eL,ω, q)]− E[W (eL, eG,ω, q∗(eL, eG,ω))] ≤
E[UpL(e
max
L (eG),ω, q)]− E[W (emaxL (eG), eG,ω, q∗(emaxL (eG), eG,ω))].
Because
E[W (emaxL (eG), eG,ω, q
∗(emaxL (eG), eG,ω))] > E[W (eL, eG,ω, q
∗(eL, eG,ω))]
it must hold that
E[UpL(eL,ω, q)] < E[U
p
L(e
max
L (eG)ω, q)]
and consequently epL ≥ emaxL (eG).
Note that this directly implies epL ≥ e∗L. In a similar way one can
show that the government’s privately optimal investment level exceeds
the socially best response to any investment of the landowner. This
directly implies epG ≥ e∗G.
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2.2. Proof of Theorem II.1
Proof. Let us prove that the landowner’s investment incentives, under
the compensation regimes considered in Section 3, can be ranked in the
following way:
∀eL ∈ eSBCL : eFCL = epL ≥ eL ≥ eSOPV CL = e∗L ≥ eNCL = 0. (II.3)
In Appendix 2.1, it was explained that epL is, for any eG, at least as
high as the greatest element of eSBRL (eG). Because e
FC
L = e
p
L and the
landowner’s best response under the social benefit compensation regime
is equivalent to the social best response, the first claim directly follows.
Let us establish that any eL ∈ eSBCL ≥ eSOPV CL = e∗L. To do so, consider
the difference between the landowner’s expected payoff under the social
benefit compensation regime and expected social surplus. It is given by
E[USBCL (eL, 0,ω, q
∗(eL, 0,ω))]− E[W (eL, e∗G,ω, q∗(eL, e∗G,ω))] =
E[W (eL, 0,ω, q
∗(eL, 0,ω))]− E[W (eL, e∗G,ω, q∗(eL, e∗G,ω))] =
E[min[max[V (eL,ω), S(0,ω)]− S(e∗G,ω), 0]]
which is increasing in eL due to Assumption 2. Note that we used that
the government invests zero under the SBC regime and that the socially
best response to e∗L is e
∗
G. Take any eL < e
∗
L, then
E[USBCL (eL, 0,ω, q
∗(eL, 0,ω))]− E[W (eL, e∗G,ω, q∗(eL, e∗G,ω))] ≤
E[USBCL (e
∗
L, 0,ω, q
∗(e∗L, 0,ω))]− E[W (e∗L, e∗G,ω, q∗(e∗L, e∗G,ω))].
Because expected welfare is uniquely maximized by (e∗L, e
∗
G), this implies
E[USBCL (eL, 0,ω, q
∗(eL, 0,ω))] < E[USBCL (e
∗
L, 0,ω, q
∗(e∗L, 0,ω))]
and consequently any eL ∈ eSBCL ≥ eSOPV CL = e∗L. Since eNCL = 0, it
is clear that eSOPV CL > e
NC
L . Similarly, we can rank the government’s
investment incentives:
∀eG ∈ eFCG : eNCG = epG ≥ eSOPV CG = e∗G ≥ eG ≥ eSBCG = 0. (II.4)
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In Appendix 2.1, it was explained that epG ≥ e∗G. Because eNCG = epG and
eSOPV CG = e
∗
G, it directly follows that e
NC
G ≥ eSOPV CG . The proof that
eSOPV CL is at least as high as any eG ∈ eFCG can be done the same way
it was proven that any eL ∈ eSBCL ≥ eSOPV CL and is left to the reader.
Finally, any eG ∈ eFCG ≥ eSBCG , because eSBCG = 0.
2.3. Overinvestment under the SOPVC regime
To highlight that the regime suggested by Miceli and Segerson (2007b),
called social optimal property value compensation in Section 3, may
indeed induce overinvestment if the government is benevolent, let us
consider the following simple example. We consider a non-stochastic
situation where there is only one state of the world ω ∈ Ω. The value of
the landowner’s property is given by V (eL) = 2
√
eL whereas the social
benefit of the taking is given by S(eG) =
4
3 . Thus, in the social optimum,
optimal investment is given by e∗L = e
∗
G = 0 and a taking occurs with
certainty. Let us assume that compensation is paid according to the
social optimal property value compensation regime proposed by Miceli
and Segerson (2007b). Since the socially efficient amount of investment
is zero, compensation amounts to V (0) = 2
√
0 = 0.
The government, being benevolent, takes the landowner’s property
whenever V (eL) ≤ 43 .4 The landowner’s payoff amounts to:
V (eL) =
−eL eL ≤ 492√eL − eL eL > 49 .
Knowing that she receives no compensation if a taking occurs, the
landowner invests such that a taking does not occur with certainty. It
is thus optimal for the landowner to overinvest, eL = 1. In a stochastic
example, the landowner would have an incentive to overinvest to reduce
the probability that a taking occurs.
4Our overinvestment result holds independent of the tie-breaking assumption.
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3. Appendix to Chapter III
3.1. Mixed Strategy Equilibria
In the main part of the chapter we have established our breakdown result
for equilibria in pure strategies only. In this section, we demonstrate
that if a breakdown is the unique equilibrium outcome in pure strategies
it must also be the unique equilibrium outcome in mixed strategies.
It is clear that the introduction of mixed strategies does not make it
more likely that an agreement equilibrium exists in the sequential case.
Recall that the airport ex-ante knows that it makes a loss if it reaches
an agreement with one of the farmers. Thus in equilibrium, the airport
only makes offers that the farmers reject with certainty.
A more interesting case to consider is whether our breakdown result
continues to hold if the farmers can use mixed strategies after a simul-
taneous offer by the airport. In the main part, we argued that for both
farmers to accept a simultaneous offer, the airport has to offer them at
least their respective Rubinstein payoffs. This payoff they can ensure
themselves by refusing the airport’s offer, given that the other farmer
accepts. If the farmers use mixed strategies, it may be possible that the
airport offers less than the farmers’ respective Rubinstein payoffs which
they accept with positive probability. Before we establish that even then
a breakdown may be the unique equilibrium outcome, let X1, X2, XA de-
note the parties’ payoffs if both farmers reject the offer5 and p1, p2 the
probabilities with which the farmers accept the offer.
Let us first consider case (iii) where, if only one of the farmers rejects
the offer, the Rubinstein game starts in the same period. Then, the
airport’s payoff is given by
σA = p1p2(S − B1 − B2) + p1(1− p2)(S − B1 −R2)
+ (1− p1)p2(S −R1 − B2) + (1− p1)(1− p2)XA. (A.4)
We can rule out equilibria in which one farmer, say farmer 1, accepts or
5If the game ends after both farmers rejected the offer, XA = 0 and X1 = V1, X2 = V2
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rejects with certainty. In that case, farmer 2 must at least receive his
Rubinstein payoff to accept the offer with positive probability. Then, the
airport’s payoff amounts to S −B1−R2 independent of whether farmer
2 accepts the offer or not. Because trade cannot occur sequentially and
B1 ≥ V1, we know that this term is negative. Thus, the airport is better
off to make an offer that both farmers reject with certainty. Let us now
consider the case where both farmers accept and reject with positive
probability. In any mixed strategy equilibrium, the farmers must be
indifferent between acceptance and rejection, which implies:
B1 = p2(R1 −X1) +X1 and B2 = p1(R2 −X2) +X2. (A.5)
Using (A.5) , we can rewrite (A.4) as
σA =
<0￿ ￿￿ ￿
p1(S −R2 −X1)+
<0￿ ￿￿ ￿
p2(S −R1 −X2)
−p1p2(S −X1 −X2)￿ ￿￿ ￿
<0
+(1− p1)(1− p2)XA < XA. (A.6)
Recall that X1 ≥ V1 and X2 ≥ V2. Because trade cannot occur sequen-
tially, S−R2−X1 < 0 and S−R1−X2 < 0. Thus, the left hand side of
(A.6) is strictly smaller than XA. Because the airport can ensure itself
a payoff of XA by making offers that both farmers reject with certainty,
we can conclude that it has no incentive to make offers that the farmers
accept with positive probability.
Let us now consider case (iv) where if only one of the farmers accepts
the airport’s offer, the Rubinstein game between the airport and the
other farmer begins one period later. This implies that the price for the
first parcel is paid immediately whereas the value of the runway S and
the price paid for the second parcel are discounted once. We can write
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the airport’s payoff as
σA = p1p2(S − B1 − B2) + p1(1− p2)[δAS − B1 − δAR2 + (1− δA)V A1 ]
+ (1− p1)p2[δAS − B2 − δAR1 + (1− δA)V A2 ] + (1− p1)(1− p2)XA
= p1p2[(1− 2δA)S + δAR2 + δAR1 − (1− δA)V A1 − (1− δA)V A2 ]
+ p1[δAS − B1 − δAR2 + (1− δA)V A1 ]
+ p2[δAS − B2 − δAR1 + (1− δA)V A2 ] + (1− p1)(1− p2)XA (A.7)
where (1−δA)V A1 and (1−δA)V A2 represent that should the airport acquire
one parcel only, it can use this parcel for one period. With the same
reasoning as in case (iii), we need to consider (p1, p2) ∈ (0, 1)×(0, 1) only.
That the farmers must be indifferent between acceptance and rejection
implies
B1 = p2(δ1R1 + (1− δ1)V1) + (1− p2)X1 and
B2 = p1(δ2R2 + (1− δ2)V2) + (1− p1)X2. (A.8)
Using (A.8), we can rewrite (A.7) as
σA = (1− p1)(1− p2)XA + p1p2[(1− 2δA)S + δAR2 + δAR1 − (1− δA)V A1
− (1− δA)V A2 − δ1R1 − (1− δ1)V1 −X2 − δ2R2 − (1− δ2)V2 −X2]
+ p1 [δAS −X1 − δAR2 + (1− δA)V A1 ]￿ ￿￿ ￿
<0
+ p2 [δAS −X2 − δAR1 + (1− δA)V A1 ]￿ ￿￿ ￿
<0
. (A.9)
Note that because X1 ≥ V1 and X2 ≥ V2 and because it is not profitable
for the airport to acquire the parcels sequentially, the terms in the last
line are smaller than zero. Let us multiply these two terms by p1 and
p2, respectively. Because we leave the first and the second line of (A.9)
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unchanged, the total expression must be bigger than σA. Hence
σA < (1− p1)(1− p2)XA + p1p2[(1− 2δA)S + δAR2 + δAR1 − (1− δA)V A1
− (1− δA)V A2 − δ1R1 − (1− δ1)V1 −X2 − δ2R2 − (1− δ2)V2 −X2]
+ p1p2[δAS −X1 − δAR2 + (1− δA)V A1 ]
+ p1p2[δAS −X2 − δAR1 + (1− δA)V A1 ]
= (1− p1)(1− p2)XA
+ p1p2[S − δ1R1 − δ2R2 −X1 −X2 − (1− δ1)V1 − (1− δ2)V2]
< p1p2[S − δ1R1 − (1− δ1)V1 − δ2R2 − (1− δ2)V2]
+ (1− p1)(1− p2)XA < XA.
Because trade is also not possible simultaneously in pure strategies, the
bracketed term in the last line is smaller than zero (see Condition 4).
Hence, the airport is better off to make offers that the farmers reject
with certainty.
3.2. Proof of Lemma 1
In order to prove Lemma 1, let Γ(k) denote the size of the pie the airport
and farmer k negotiate over. From the main part, we know that the pie
between the airport and the last farmer is given by
Γ(N) := S − (N − 1)V
A + V
N
. (A.10)
Anticipating the size of the pie the airport and farmer k negotiate over,
the airport and farmer k − 1 negotiate over a pie of size
Γ(k − 1) : =
Joint surplus in case of trade￿ ￿￿ ￿
δA
￿
(1− δF )Γ(k)
1− δAδF +
(k − 1)V A
N
￿
+ (1− δA)V
A(k − 1)
N
−
−
￿
(k − 2)V A
N
+
V
N
￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿
Joint surplus in case of no trade
= δA
￿
(1− δF )Γ(k)
1− δAδF
￿
− V − V
A
N
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Here, (1−δF )1−δAδF represents the fraction the airport gets from the total bar-
gaining pie. The term (k−1)V
A
N represents the fact that the airport owns
k− 1 parcels if it agrees with farmer k− 1 and can use these parcels for
one more period. As mentioned in the main part, a bargaining pie may in
principle be negative. Because this directly implies that the airport and
farmer 1 would never have agreed, let us define the function Γ(k) as if the
parties would also share negative pies according to the Rubinstein for-
mula. Note that Γ(k) ≥ V−V AN , ∀k = 1, ..., N is a necessary condition for
trade to occur: If any airport-farmer pair bargains over a pie of strictly
negative size, it is optimal for them to stop negotiating. If these inequal-
ities hold strictly, all airport-farmer pairs bargain over a strictly positive
pie and thus reach an agreement. Hence, Γ(k) > 0, ∀k = 1, ..., N , is a
sufficient condition for trade to occur. Let us derive Γ(k) by induction:
Lemma 2:
Γ(k) =
￿
S − (N − 1)V
A + V
N
￿￿
δA(1− δF )
1− δAδF
￿N+1−k
−
N￿
i=k+1
V − V A
N
￿
δA(1− δF )
1− δAδF
￿N+1−i
. (A.11)
Proof. Let us first show that the statement is true for the induction
basis. Plugging in k = N yields the Induction basis:
Γ(N) = S − (N − 1)V
A + V
N
(A.10)
which is the size of the pie the airport and the last farmer negotiate over.
We still have to prove that if the statement holds for k it also holds for
k − 1:
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Induction step: Given Γ(k) as defined in (A.11),
Γ(k − 1) = δA(1− δF )
1− δAδF Γ(k)−
V − V A
N
=
￿
S − (N − 1)V
A + V
N
￿￿
δA(1− δF )
1− δAδF
￿N+2−k
−
N￿
i=k+1
V − V A
N
￿
δA(1− δF )
1− δAδF
￿N+2−i
− V − V
A
N
=
￿
S − (N − 1)V
A + V
N
￿￿
δA(1− δF )
1− δAδF
￿N+1−(k−1)
−
N￿
i=k
V − V A
N
￿
δA(1− δF )
1− δAδF
￿N+1−i
= Γ(k − 1)
which proves the lemma.
We know that Γ(k) ≥ V−V AN , ∀k = 1, ..., N − 1 is a necessary condition
for trade to occur. Plugging in k = 1 and reorganizing yields (III.6),
which proves the first part of Lemma 1.
From the recursive definition, we can deduce that Γ(k) is strictly in-
creasing in k. Hence, if Γ(k0) ≤ V−V AN for some k0, Γ(k) < 0, ∀k < k0
must hold. Hence, if Γ(1) > V−V
A
N , all bargaining pies Γ(k) are strictly
larger than V−V
A
N . Hence, all airport-farmer pairs negotiate over a pie of
strictly positive size, which proves the second part of Lemma 1.
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